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An Interpretation of Kant's Theory on the Representation of Possible Experiences: High Speculative Representation and Fine-Grained Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

Kant's theory on the conditions of experience contributes to representing the possible object of scientific theories. I will argue that this is a viable solution to explain how fine-grained knowledge of necessary empirical statements is possible. The analytic part of Kant's work, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1988), exposes the function of objective reference mapping, which involves a *proto-semantic* conception of the *intentional structure* to represent possible objects. It intends to solve the difficulties in the representation of concepts whose *hyper-speculative* content is not discernible by examples (sensible intuition), nor by formulas (*Organon* of speculative knowledge), nor by mathematical categories (models, projections). My exposition strategy will develop the narration of Kant's category theory, founded on apperceptive concepts, as a response to the challenges of semantic indiscernibility. Moreover, as the paper builds momentum, I will include a discussion of some twentieth-century attempts to provide knowledge of the logical form of modal statements (I choose to debate Russell's and Kripke's accounts of modal knowledge).

Keywords: Immanuel Kant; possible experience; semantic indiscernibility; modal knowledge.

KANT'S REASONS TO SUBMIT ALL KNOWLEDGE TO THE CONTENT OF THE MEDIATION UNITY OF JUDGMENT

Immanuel Kant on Knowledge: The Mediation Unity of Judgment

In the First Book of *Transcendental Analytic*, where Immanuel Kant discusses his preliminary strategies for guiding the discovery of pure concepts, there is a particularly

underestimated, if not ignored, contribution to the modern discussion about the difference between intension and extension. Kant begins his introduction by defining judgment as the ability to produce mediated knowledge. As concepts, they only have meaning if they are used in judgments; "they are but the instruments of mediation: a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it" (Nuzzo, 2005, p. 30). The project of deriving a table of pure concepts, understood as those that owe nothing to sensibility, is to some extent taken from this matrix idea. Conceptual mediation is the function of unity that subsumes concepts, producing a foundation that can serve as a common support for many propositions. The discussion is about the intensional role of concepts. It is a discussion about inferential mediation rather than reflections on the relationship between reference, denotation, and truth. Categories are platforms for truth-mediation. Kant is discussing the mediating structures of subsumption that specify an ideal object and not a mere exemplification: "with regard to the accuracy and clearness of the knowledge of understanding, the examples are, in general, more harmful than advantageous, since they only rarely satisfy the condition of the rule" (Kant, 1988a, p. 134/B 173).

A possible interpretation, not entirely foreign to the text, could be that the table of judgments directly results from the thesis that concepts are mediators of unity between representations. I will see the degree to which this follows the observations Kant uses to guide the task. An important first consideration is that the first two sets of categories should be called "mathematical," and the last two should be called "dynamic." This division corresponds to "a foundation present in the nature of understanding" (Kant, 1988a, p. B110). The second observation points to the threefold division within each group of categories. For Kant, the need for the *third term* in each class of categories follows that there is an independent act, not reducible to the other two, which refers to an irreducible way of mediating the unity of representations. In the concept of number, the idea of totality can be reduced neither from plurality nor from unity. In the concept of relationship, the influence that two substances can have on each other is not derivable either from the substance alone or from causality. I will leave the third observation for now because this paper depends only on the second observation to advance its premises.

The peculiarity of the third term of each category is that it refers to the relationship of content with knowledge. Without needing to know much more, what is different, and what Kant considers an extrapolation of the traditional logical sphere of competence, is that there is a particular *relation to knowledge* (Dizdarevikj & Dizdarevikj, 2018). I can quickly return to Kant's pertinent definition of concept and judgment to make this clear. For him, these are the mediating elements of unity. However, only concerning *knowledge* can one cover the coding unity of material mediation in induction, empirical investigations, analogies, presumptions, and speculation. In those cases, mere [general] logical knowledge of non-contradiction will not enrich what can be learned by empirical instantiation. The incongruity of the coding elements can only be subsumed into one unit if mediation is not merely based on the non-contradiction rule. *Covering the ground* that expands the *unity of matter* between one representation and the other is necessary. I need to represent the cumulative element of learning that distinguishes a stage of ignorance from a stage of minor ignorance. Furthermore, this involves a relation of past and future knowledge that a proposition cannot represent in a theory of quantification, in a syllogism, or any form of mechanical semantic interpretation.

According to Kant, the possible mediation of the content of conceptual representations derives from a representation of its systematic unity. This aspect of his theory was remembered and invoked by Husserl (2001) in his *Prolegomena*: "the unity of an experience is for Kant the unity of objective legality: it falls, therefore, under the concept of theoretical unity" (p. 149). For the cases that the non-contradiction rule would not do the job, Kant thinks I need to generate learning of the schematic content of the speculation: transcendental knowledge of the content of representations.

Mediation and fine-grained representation: the discussion of Logical form in terms of the problem of discrimination of the content of a judgment

Strictly speaking, there is no monotonous part within the routes of the Transcendental Deduction, which condenses one of the most inspiring pieces of philosophical argumentation of all time. From a historical perspective, the argument can be read as a response to Hume and to a specific generalization of the induction problem, i.e., the problem of discerning subjective connections that are also objective. In Kant's words, Hume "could not explain at all how it is possible for the understanding to think on concepts that in themselves are not combined in the understanding as still combined in the object" (McWherter, 2012, p. 70).

I will not enter into the condensed decoding jungle of the various strategies contained in Kant's Deduction; instead, I will identify the argument with the development of the concept of transcendental apperception and its task of constructing the unity of the rule that gives representations its objectivity, that is, what distinguishes it from the mere free association of representations. Two citations will serve as a basis to justify the chosen approach:

> All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since, namely, instead of an immediate representation [i.e., an intuition] a higher representation, which subsumes this [representation] and others, is used for cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one (Kant's quotation in Guyer, 1987, p. 97).
>
> In original apperception, everything must necessarily conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, that is, to the universal functions of synthesis, namely of that synthesis according to concepts in which alone apperception can demonstrate *a priori* its complete and necessary identity (Kant's quotation in Longuenesse, 2020, p. 52).

The tension between a random and subjective combination of perceptions and the act by which they come to represent an objective instruction of meaning can be seen at different times in Kant's work. In the B deduction, however, the act of judgment is emphasized as the event in which objectivity is produced along with the representation: "judgment is nothing but the manner in which to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of consciousness." The copula is the device "to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective" (Kant, 1988a, p. B141-2). The last quote suggests that the author describes the copula of judgment as a type of primitive mediating construction that initiates the path to objectivity. The *Deduction* explains how the unity of cognition in objective intentionality develops in coordination with the

concept of apperception (Tolley, 2020). It also comes from the idea that all categories and a priori knowledge are reflexive.

The present suggestion of interpretation is a reading strategy aligned with the particular purposes of this paper, and it makes some assumptions. First, it takes for granted a kind of historical contribution of the *deductive principle* that transcends the author's argumentation. I shall, by this assertion, conflate a reading of Kant's work in which the *Transcendental Deduction* first fails as a general argument against Humean skepticism. Secondly, despite failing as direct anti-skepticism, the *deduction* represents the technical culmination of the entire Kantian conception of autonomy and rule-guiding representation. This current phase of my interpretation involves the assumption that the concept of perception was never enough to build a defense against the skeptic. However, it represents, in fact, a conceptual intermediary in the route for Kant to connect the objectivity of ideals or universal content of judgment-categories *a priori* and his moral and practical perspective. This connection with the practical part of Kant's philosophy depends on the thesis about the reflective ability to generate from my own spontaneous means the objectivity of the represented possibilities, that is, to *discriminate* against merely possible objects. That will become clearer when I look at the hypothetical judgments.

Now, I shall give myself the right to select what is for us the most intriguing discussion within Deduction B, section 19, which refers to Kant's suspicion of the way logicians formulate the concept of *link or connection (conjunctio)* in a judgment. To situate myself in this reading, I consider this passage to be a pre-discussion about the nature of logical form. Alternatively, I can think of it as a discussion of the knowledge of the inferential properties of judgment. In a prochronistic but convenient terminology, I might say that the discussion circles around the problem of generating the *intentionality* that projects the inferential content. Therefore, it is not a simple discussion of general logical form but a discussion of the *object*—or better, the *possible object*—of the logical pattern. In this case, the author is concerned about how a link, coded by any representative means, can generate *mediation content* that maximizes the conditions of possibility modeled by the judgment *copula*. The use of the verbal copula must imply knowledge of the inferential pattern that it authorizes, i.e., the knowledge of the maximum identity that it has with similar judgments, to the point of embedding a margin of similar conclusions. The copula of judgment is the simplest expression of mediation (Chiurazzi, 2021). It is the primitive way of linking representations, mediating discursive knowledge, and therefore it serves as a proto-model for projecting propositional content and knowledge of the inferential characteristics projected by the expression of "is."

The mediating character of *verbal copula* is not evident at first glance, as it is an incomplete syllogism or reasoning. Nevertheless, this mediation can be better understood when I think of primitive ways of using symbolic instruments, such as images, icons, and analogies. Each of these forms a different mediation content. The problem is that this can be done in many ways, some more superficial than others. One who says that "Italy is a high-heel boot" may be speaking the truth in an analogical way, but it is hard to give a semantic account of that sentence which is not categorically poor: its general semantic traces cannot project a pattern of meaning with great potential for enriching the knowledge about Italy. In *Logic* (1988b), Kant speaks of analogies in the same context as induction. This choice should not be taken as a wild coincidence:

"induction and analogy are (...) only logical presumptions" (p. 84). This passage contains a vital piece of the Kantian puzzle: it shows a pattern of the author's thought, namely, his tendency to consider the speculative structure of representations as possible only from a transcendental, non-dialectical point of view. Just as induction does not represent objective knowledge, nor does an analogy contain a judgment in the strong sense, that is, the sense in which a judgment represents a minimal mediation unit of apperceptive cognition.

If I judge the sentence as a figure of speech, there is a figurative or iconic cognition in it, but it can only link subjective traits of the representations. For a contemporary semanticist, the Kantian text is vague in this part. It is so because the author did not live in a historical moment when the discussion about the nature of the logical form had developed as in contemporary times. The author just says it is not enough:

> to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all representations (Kant, 1988a, p. B 142).

Again, in current semantic discussions, this seems to say very little because it is not clear how a principle of determination could exhaust the possible interpretations of an expression in an "objective" way as opposed to a merely "subjective" way. If a computer operates the interpretation, what is objective and what is subjective in that operation? For us, this apparent historical condition that limits Kant's thought can be studied with benefits for modern semantic discussion. The author was not limited to thinking about the possible interpretations of a sentence in terms of the models that can map values to them, and so he was also not limited to thinking of the "logical form" as a kind of syntax or primitive logical grammar. The author thinks of the form of judgment as a process involving the continuity of object discrimination, and this does not need to be done in a single assertive unit. A single sentence or utterance does not need to encompass all the propositional content mediated by the judgment. The unity of interpretation can be done in phases, as in a heuristic speculative investigation; it is not necessary to institute a functional and mathematical model (Fx) that would compute the possible interpretations of the target sentence. This reading explains why Kant can advance the discussion in the terms he does: there are ways to set the conditions of interpretation of a sentence that are subjective and others objective. Indeed, there are ways of initiating a mediating speculative course of an investigation that is more or less *discriminative* for the object, and there are ways of enunciating a claim to the truth that can be more or less objective, as in presumptions (induction and analogies).

I can easily understand this fact if I locate Kant debating the problem of high-speculative induction and not the problem about the logical form. However, as I have already said, since he is debating the problem of the logical form, I found a conflict. Nevertheless, it remains to be said that for him, there was still no apparent difference between these two problems: for Kant, the logical form of a judgment either can be merely associative, or it can contain an objective unity. In the first case, it is a bad judgment, for it has no empirical projection; it is merely speculative (in a wrong inductive way). Moreover, it contains a presumption of an ideal or super-sensible object, and it needs a transcendental faculty to be unified as knowledge instead of a mere

abstract, indiscernible presumption. And so I have, as a result, the explanation of the title of this subsection. For Kant, the discussion of the logical form discusses the mediating phases of high-speculative knowledge.

So far, I have had a widespread discussion about logical form. However, it gets complicated because this familiar piece of syntax, "is," can represent that projection of formal similarity in poor or rich ways. It can mediate its discursive content in a variety of ways. Kant did not have a particularly enthusiastic opinion on people who, in order to judge, need to be helped by examples or formulas. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (1988a) the Kant employed the charge of "stultifying" to express his opinion on this deficiency of the faculty of judgment. Other translation options to English cannot do much to slow down the charge. For him, judging is mediated discrimination, and if this is to be achieved with knowledge, I must avoid generating indiscernible content that grossly locates its possible objects. In those cases, I will have not only lousy judgment but no judgment at all. Paying attention to Kant's concept of lack of intelligence, stupidity, and minority (lack of enlightenment) in judgment is a first clue to the thesis that *a priori* synthesis made through apperceptive concepts - that generates the categories of knowledge - represents more than a rare state of judgment activity; it is, in fact, the basis of any discriminating representation of fine-grained content.

FINE-GRAINED CONTENT IN HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENTS: HYPER-SPECULATION AND SYSTEMATIC UNITY

Kant's answer to represent the content of dynamic categories and modal statements

I shall now turn to the corollaries. I may extract and assume that, along with a discussion of logical form, Kant is advancing a discussion about the coding-relation of the mental acts and the objects. This debate matured in the writings of Edmund Husserl many years after Kant: "we shall, on the one hand, have acts essential to the expression if it is to be an expression at all, i.e., a verbal sound infused with meaning.... But we shall, on the other hand, have acts... which stand to it in the logically based relation of fulfillment ..." (Husserl, 2001, p. 192). A less orthodox interpretation may risk linking this line of thought to the discussions that arose in analytical philosophy about the *semantic form*, understood as a discussion of the elements of the representation that map a value to a sentence, generalizing its predictive content or its model of possible truth. However, it is not easy to circumvent the disinterest of the 18th-century German author in matters of language. However, what is peculiar in his theory of judgment and apperception involves the function of the verbal copula, which appears in this division of mental tasks as a linguistic device. The verbal copula guides the intentional direction or instructional mapping of the objective reference margin, initiating a discursive, mediated, or conceptual characterization of the object's knowledge. For example, using the word "is" to link the body and the weight in "The body is heavy" sets forth the basis of a discursive dispute that accumulates theoretical learning about the mediated or projected object. The copula models the conceptual mediation that gives this intentional relationship its ideal, non-affected, or *a priori* phenomenological coordinates. In Husserl's words: "the function of a word is to awaken a sense-conferring act in ourselves, to point to what is intended, or perhaps to give intuitive fulfillment in this act, and to guide our interest exclusively in this direction" (Husserl, 2001, p. 193).

Kant's take on that discussion does not develop further in the Deduction B (or A). As I advance through the text, I feel the need to get back a few paragraphs and check the nature of the author's protest against the inability of the formulation of logicians to explain the content of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments: "without quarreling here about what is mistaken about this explanation, that in any case it fits only categorical and never hypothetical and disjunctive judgments" (Kant, 1988a, p. B 141). This protest is the only material I have had to work on so far. The miserable situation of hypothetical and disjunctive sentences is easily verified today because their limitations are apparent from the modern semantic point of view. In the book I of *Transcendental Dialectics*, Kant places the problem as one related to a possible synthesis of the content of judgment: "We must therefore seek for (...) the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system" (Kant, 1988a, p. A 323/B 380).

The problem is that both the hypothetical and disjunctive sentences are prospective. They project a synthetic unity. They project their possible instantiations. Here the semantic problem is obvious: this prospecting is done relative to what? to an object? To a truth value? To a truth-maker? All these alternatives bring difficulties. How is one expected to model, in language, something like an "object of prospective speculation"? How to make a prospective object discernible? By my reading hypothesis, Kant discusses how the expression of a rule that encodes the synthesis between concepts can express its intentionality or semantic form, that is, how it can model the projection of an object or a truth value. I am talking about a theoretical task that develops *a priori* aspects of the intentionality of psychological acts. It is the theory that Husserl called phenomenology and that the twentieth century preferred to demystify by merging its problems with those of semantics.

Now, why was Kant quarreling - without quarreling - with the fact that only categorical judgments fit the description of logicians of logical form as the relation of concepts? Of course, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments display relations between judgments and not concepts. However, this is not enough for this critique to make sense. The problem is the hyper-speculative nature of hypothetical judgments, i.e., that what is thought in the relationship between the judgments is not an example, and their meaning is not a learned response to their possible instances. Instead, it is a norm or the *theoretical specification* of the latter's justification on the grounds of the first: "it is only the implication that is thought by means of that judgment" (Kant, 1988a, p. A74/B 99). I have to consider the fact that the relational conditions of hypothesis and disjunctions are richer or more complex than the conditions of assertoric/categorical judgments. They individuate a hyper-intensional content, meaning that it only makes sense - is modeled - inside a theoretical unity that systematizes the relation between the consequence and the antecedent.

In other words, the category judgment models the relationship with the object, but the hypothetical judgment models not only this relationship but the "possible relationship" between the concepts. It makes correlations between mere presumptions. They compare the patterns of the judgments and reach conclusions about the standard features of the prediction patterns in a systematic unity. In the words of Husserl, "into such a constitution, second-order concepts, i.e., concepts of concepts and of other ideal unities enter" (Husserl 2001, p. 153). If the systematic unity that sustains the categorial net of the concepts is changed, I will lose the grounds for the hypothesis. In my reading,

Kant would say that some richer or fine-grained judgments cannot model the relation to the object-semantically or phenomenologically-as an adequate answer to the possible fulfillment. What I am saying is that it is evident for hypothetical judgments because a *possible fulfillment* is not modeled as fulfillment at all. The hypothesis instantiates nothing but its own categorial ground for justifying the consequence by the antecedent (they are ideal *specifications*). I could model it, and semantics could make it happen artificially. However, the format of the referred object will be a mediating creature like "the ability of q to be implied by p." The second phase of analytical philosophers would recognize the normative or grammatical nature of that knowledge: "a modal or normative property (...) cannot significantly be said to be exemplified by a particular" (Sellars, 2007, p. 23). The only way of giving it a semantic value is to reach the hyper-speculative context (the normative unity of theory) in which that hypothetical link makes sense as a universal instruction of meaning.

A dialogue with alternative modal theories: Russell and Kripke

To answer the last question, I will have to briefly discuss a more recent philosophical engagement with this problem. First, let us get into the theme of modal representation in modern semantics. It is a well-known fact that intensional and model content can hardly be modeled by our traditional linguistic means. The various paradoxes of identity and infractions of Leibniz's law - interchangeability *Salva Veritate* - are testimonies to that effect (Lewis & Vasishth, 2013). For that reason, they have been the paradigm of indiscernibility in skeptical arguments about necessary truths. If they cannot be modeled linguistically, they seem to fail to acquire a logical representation. So to know that the sun rising tomorrow is necessary is not to know a proposition at all - it is almost like a psychological trick of habit, a subjective connection with no rational grounds.

The above description is a rough but proper way of describing skepticism about necessary truths. Of course, this prompts non-skeptical thinkers into developing intensional logical systems. Possible-worlds semanticists disagreed with those skepticists from the beginning and assumed the task of giving a stable logical characterization of modal statements in a way that matches the needs of extensional logical theories. They succeed indeed, but the cost was that they only modeled the coarse-grained aspect of that content or the self-consistency of the statement. They were never able to model the particular fine-grained intensional content of the modal statements, and instead, they offered a reduction of that content to a set of possible worlds.

I will discuss two modern proposed solutions that make this possible: to quantify over the scope of variables or to individualize possible worlds using semantic devices that allow the representation of a rigid reference. The first is possible with a wide-scope interpretation of referential terms over modals. The last, by assuming the rigid aspect of some terms, like proper names. Thus, for example, Russell's wide scopism suggested that some referential terms (like the King of France) should take wide-scope over modal adverbs in order to preserve their constant content or their insensibility to context when figured in hypothetical or speculative representations:

> The distinction of primary and secondary occurrences also enables us to deal with whether the present King of France is bald or not bald, and generally with the logical status of denoting phrases that denote nothing. (...)Thus "the present King of France is bald" is certainly false;

> and " the present King of France is not bald" is false if it means "There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald," but is true if it means "It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald" (Russell, 1905, p. 490).

The above method is the course of action I must take if I am to model the possible truth of sentences with references like this. Otherwise, I would never be able to model its falsity in contrast with its possible truth because the truth-functional projections of the sentence "*The King of France is Bald"* would be false *even in the circumstances of negation of its falsity*. There would be no representation of the possible truth (the group of possible states of things) that is excluded when I say that the proposition is false. Only using some optimal paraphrase can I represent truth-functionally the possible circumstances or the truth-table row in which the sentence would be false. That would be the circumstance in which it is true that "It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald."

On the other hand, Saul Kripke suggests that proper names be designated rigidly (Van Langendonck,1999). When one uses a proper name, he is fixing the reference so he can retrieve it *a priori* using a mathematical instruction or an algorithm. Thus, names would be sophisticated keys: they could unlock a semantic value that is neutral to possible circumstances. Instruments like this help our activities of presumption, analogy, and hypothesis. This thesis advocates that the way one can draw back the same semantic value from a name in modal contexts is unique, even if its reference fixing is discovered *a posteriori* and historically. It is like a password or a key for just that locker and refers back to it in any circumstance. Kripke thinks that the definite description theory can't show the stable modal behavior that a reference should have to help sentences make sense in situations that aren't true. This means that Kripke needs to know if the sentence would still be true in similar but not real situations. The digression ends here with the following conclusion: Both attempts have some noticeable similarities. Russell takes the denoting expression out of the scope of modals and quantifiers to isolate its modal profile and create an improvised reference "x" for it under the condition of being the King of France. Kripke assumes that there are devices inside language to get that reference isolated from modal contexts, but we do that more intuitively by using proper names. Both agree, though, in the reduction of the theoretical content to its extensional content.

Moreover, they both agree that there is a coding solution to the problem. Incomplete denotative codes are substituted by stable and timeless mathematical coordinates, being a proper name or something like Russell's denotative value in the form of abstract predicates, like the "condition of being the King of France." This method allows for the mapping of a single semantic value to our interpretations of sentences even in intensional contexts and, possibly, in hyper-intensional contexts. To sum up things, they present the modal profile of a sentence, and that is it. The question remains, however. What is learned by that profile if not the mentioned *systematic unity* of the behavior of the consequent of a hypothesis under the condition of the antecedent? I argue that this is all that has been learned. They teach that by omitting the normative character of the relationship because, as gifted mathematicians, they think they can describe the hypothetical link as a feature of the model. The mathematical description would omit the norm. Of course, they cannot do it. Mathematics is incapable of projecting the supersensible or the thing in itself. It only encompasses the systematic

unity of the cognitive cognition of the possibilities. Mathematical functional correlations are just an extensional expression of the normative content.

Kant would not be content with this presentation of the cognitive problem. Because for him, it would not be enough to solve the transcendental problem of producing a possible object in dynamic circumstances. To speak as Beatrice Longuenesse (1998):

> the problem of the nature of mathematical thinking interests Kant only insofar as solving it might help clarify the conditions of possibility of experience and thus, more generally, the relation between cognitive subjects and objects of cognition of thought (p. 290).

Having fixed that idea, I can now answer why Kant does not feel confident that one can mathematically model that reference relation in hypothetical judgments. I know how Kant generally thinks of speculation: it only has intuitive value if it respects the limits of experience. It is the way Kant's intrigues are formed on this theme from the beginning of the first *Critique* when he talks about the speculative nature of metaphysics: "Reason falls into this perplexity through no fault of his own." But therefore it falls into obscurities and contradictions"(Kant, 1988a, p. A viii). The problem is that I may not be able to find accurate intuitive fulfillment along the paths of reason in the form of exemplification, confirmation, etc. The merely projected fulfillment can be disputed, and, what is worse, we would not be able to decide the dispute.

Compared to possible sentences, resemblances are nothing more than extracting common features from different patterns. It does not project an object, but rather a path of possible experiences. What I can do is to give them a pragmatic value, a promissory value. In any case, this solution is not a concern for semantics. Because all a semantic theory can care about is if one can find a mathematical engineered instruction to coordinate the hypothetical circumstances (in Kant's scheme), isolating the possible worlds in which something would be mapped to a truth value. As I suggested before, they seem to be concerned about gambling issues that arise in economic assessments, relating, for example, to predicting an opponent's possible assumption. Those methods help one adjust his assumptions to the game, but they do not give him anything more: it is a mathematical way of measuring chances. It does not provide one with the ability to read the political and dynamic aspects of the game. As long as one truth-value does not include an opposing truth-value in the prediction, I have truth-functional successful interpretations of speculative chances, and no more is needed for them. Kant would not condone this solution. Judging by his texts, he would not seem to share Husserl's enthusiasm about the mathematicians' ability to give a formal treatment to categorial concepts. Because mathematics, for him, only makes possible the building of intuition for non-dynamic concepts, i.e., the first couple of categories (quantity and quality). For the most relevant empirical sciences that deal with dynamic categories (relation and modality), one needs knowledge of structural links between things in a possible experience, i.e., on a possible path of intuitive fulfillment. A possible path of fulfillment can be instantiated or not, different than a schematization or mathematical diagram for representing the features of a geometric figure that always instantiates some abstract value, i.e., the value that is produced from the possibilities included in its own matter (the ideal thing: triangle, square): "mathematics fulfills this requirement by means of construction of the figure" (Kant, 1988a, p. A 240/B 299).

In the case of hypothetical judgments, the conditions under which the consequence can be mapped to a truth value depend on the projective limits given by the antecedent. Once I build a hypothetical judgment, I am bound to its complexity. The mentioned complexity is built into the judgment. It projects a *net for the truth* that captures only complex, engineered possible objects. These judgments call for caution in their *net-cast*: they are not satisfied with launching a network so coarse-grained that it would capture as truth any non-false statement (as in extensional-material implications). The attempt to project the object of hypothetical judgments into what I would now call a material-extensional implication (the truth-functional concept of the conditional: projected as truth either if the antecedent is false or the consequence is true) would be, for Kant, a violation of the hypothetical complexity of judgment. Simplifying the conditional relation to project the extensional algorithm for "if... then" is recommendable only for mathematical speculation. If I want to capture the content of what is learned under that condition, I need to extend that interpretation dynamically with the concept of a *possible experience*. Indeed, the extensional truth table fails to instantiate the *conceptual* or *intensional complexity* of that representation, which means it fails to represent the way the representation of the hypothesis fits the normative unity of the system that grounds the justification of the consequence by the antecedent. Extensionally, this justification-complexity will always be lost (extensionalists like Carnap would be counting on that: they are reductionists in their hearts). On the other hand, what is represented by the intensional complexity is the fact that it sets a necessary condition abstracted from the unity of the system of truth-in Husserl's *Prolegomena* terms, "Essential unity among the truths of a single science is the unity of explanation. ... Unity of explanation means, therefore, theoretical unity, ... homogeneous unity of legal base..." (Husserl, 2001, p. 147)

Let me organize my conclusions so far: I have seen that the problem of modeling hypotheses cannot be circumvented by simplifying the intensional complexity of the hypothetical link. The material implication of Russell's *Principia* only allows them to do that because he is counting on mathematical reductionism. On the other hand, I have to preserve intensional complexity in order to see the unity of the system in which the justification of the consequence by the antecedent is validated by law. Now, I can state that preserving the intensional complexity cannot be done mathematically. The mentioned limit is one of the mathematical categories. Intensional complexity can only be represented dynamically. As we have seen, the first was the choice of analytical philosophy in both of their best answers: Russell's wide scopism and possible world semantics (Carnap, Kripke). As we have also seen, they have no answers to more fine-grained modal representations. Kant knew that one would fail to offer a solution by simply sling-shooting abstract, non-dynamic values. The hypothetical judgments fall into this last difficulty.

The way Kant sees it, this modal characteristic of the hypothetical representation can only be thought of in a way that shows the concept of causality. Moreover, since this is a dynamical representation, Kant would not even accept mathematical coordination or diagrams to represent that unity (which he would allow for the categories of quantity and quality). Kant needs a unifying representation of the time-modal object of intention, and for that, the law of non-contradiction can hardly help. Only a reflexive representation of *possible experience* can offer that unity. Apperception is the solution. Two recent commentators can be cited here to exemplify the path of Kant's

interpretation that I am following. In Kant on the *Logical Origin of Concepts* (2015), Alexandra Newton says that the concept's form (generality) comes from the fact that this capacity is self-aware.

> If we are conscious of the internal identity of marks through self-consciousness or logical reflection, as Kant maintains, then this identity may only belong to representations that contain consciousness, and thus fall within the sphere of that which I can accompany by the 'I think'. To believe that it can belong to the objects of representations independently of apperception is to fall into the (empiricist) myth that identity is an independently given feature that may be abstracted out of these objects (abstrahere aliquid). Kant's logic avoids the myth because it does not maintain that conceptual capacities are brought into conformity with sameness and differences in the objects of representations, but instead assumes that objects (or the contents of representations) must share common features to conform to the conditions of their conceivability (i.e., to conditions of apperception) (p. 467).

Another important work on this topic, this time written by Melissa McBay Merrit (2015), shows an interpretive selection of Kant's work unified with my purpose, centered mainly on the reflective characteristics that make possible the *applied* logical knowledge (that is, not purely centered on the law of non-contradiction):

> Existing accounts of transcendental reflection fail to make good sense of Kant's presentation of it as a 'duty for metaphysicians; I will suggest that we can make sense of this if we recognize that Kant takes his cue from applied rather than pure logic. (McBay Merrit, 2015, p. 6).

These two interpretative orientations combine with mine in that central aspect: the need to think about refined representation or *conceivability* conditions or the logical application of objects that are not restricted to the law of non-contradiction. From here, I can transit to the discussion about the nature of this *conceivability*. In the case of hypothetical judgments, I believe that conceiving their representation as a *cognition* directly involves the need to represent them perceptively. The apperceptive concept represents the stages of objective perception and concepts as a unity, which is the unity of the category that sustains a causal (hypothetical) theoretical projection. It enables the projection of a super-object, that is, a non-extensional object - understood here as a form of object that is not instantiated in a simple formal or mathematical projection, but only in a theoretical projection of higher systematic order; in Husserl's terms again, this is: "the systematic unity of the ideally closed sum total of laws resting on one basic legality (Gesetzlichkeit) as their final ground" (Husserl 2001, p. 146).

Reflective instruments of speculation, apperception and dynamic, and time-conditions

Reflective devices like the representation of "I think" help the judgment adjust the object to time-circumstances, accumulating dynamic-cause-knowledge about it. By adjusting the knowledge to new patterns of systematic unity, apperception and reflexive judgment make more for semantic than quantifying over possible worlds. Kant does not reduce his logical conception to extensionalism. His need for transcendental logic is evidence that he was pushing the discussion further than that of general logic. I will

quote Alexandra Newton again to illustrate an interpretation of Kant who realized this trait:

> ...the discussion of the ways in which the understanding introduces complexity into logical space would take us beyond the first section of general logic to Kant's views on the judgment and the syllogism. And if our question is how the particular carvings or contents [Inhalt] of concepts are possible, we will be led even further afield to transcendental logic. (Newton, 2015, p. 473).

The preceding arguments support my contention that I am not out of step with Kantian work. Therefore, I argue that by placing bets on the concept of reflection as the key to Kant's solution, I can determine the possible objective relationship between modal and epistemic judgments a priori. The concept of reflection gives the representation of the *possible* non-dialectical representative character. The scheme for reflective representations is not intuition or another theoretical device, but the construction of the objective contribution of each experience to a goal of intentional filling idealized by a synthetic experiment of imagination. Discrimination of higher-order or hyper-speculative concepts, hypotheses, and theories is thus made possible by reflective experiments inside one's mind. It is the mode of composition of the possible filling of judgments dynamically and temporally. This reading is helped by the interpretation of Paul Guyer, who thinks of Transcendental Deduction as an incomplete step, and which becomes more determined in the sections in which Kant speaks of the time determinations of objective knowledge (Refutation and Schematism):

> In spite of Kant's hesitation about using an argument with no initial claim to necessary truth as a transcendental deduction, several pieces of evidence put it beyond doubt that Kant sometimes recognized at least that the deduction could not succeed without acknowledgment of the temporality of experience (Guyer, 1987, p. 87).

The same clue was followed independently by Edmund Husserl (1983) in *Ideas*: "The essential property that the designation "temporality" expresses not only stresses something inherent in general to all individual experience but a necessary way of linking the experiences" (p. 194).

CONCLUSION

It can be imagined that the intellectual or conceptual world is a great complex of *competitive necessary statements*. The great competition is the ground for the rational discernment of hyper-speculative content, which, for Kant, can easily degenerate into dialectical. The given statements are indistinguishable either from an inductive or formal point of view. Those are also indistinguishable from the empirical *simpliciter* point of view. There is no way to model it unless I can find a norm or normative content that unifies the material of those representations.

Apperception is presented by Immanuel Kant as a modeling device. It is the subjective means to make selections over that speculative content, bringing them to systematic unity. Consciousness is the normative state in which a contextually limited representation becomes *discernible or conceivable*. The representation of synthetic judgments a priori, which discriminate between the possible truth and determine the conditions of the necessary truth, involves the representation of a richer and more granular content than mere general-logical knowledge (non-contradiction).

Of course, an empirical statement will always be ambiguous in different modal circumstances, especially when contrary to factual circumstances. It would work as one type of cognition in one circumstance (for example, in vitro), but that cognition could be canceled in another circumstance (for example, in the human body). In order to give a unitary value to that ambiguity, and since that is the aim of science, one should not look for super-sensible objects. Instead, it must be possible to codify the ambiguity as some ingredient value with a controller that would unlock it depending on the informational-knowledge context. What is apperceptive about that knowledge is nothing but awareness of the *systematic unity* of the representations of possibility in different informational-knowledge circumstances. So, I may say Kant had a theory of empirical speculative representation, using apperceptive concepts that bring the matter's multiplicity into circles of systematic unity of knowledge.

Attempts to code that systematic unity of knowledge by wide scope or rigidity, as I have seen, have limited success. It works only for mathematical purposes, creating switch-codes that provide knowledge as to why the learning properties of some substances (like medicine) work for teaching something, e.g., *activelyin vitro,* but only *potentially* in the human body (depending on the rest of the information given by the human body). One could model different contributions (possible, actual, etc.) to the truth using that resource. There is naturally a *rationale* to account for those modal divergences in possible-world semantics and widescope representations. However, I do not learn anything about the supra-sensible by using those semantic devices without relating them to knowledge content. As Alexandra Newton (2015) puts it: "It is only natural that questions should remain concerning the relationship between a concept's form and its content. But these are not questions of general logic" (p. 475).

Few thinkers followed Kant's advice about the limits of general logic to account for intelligible but substantial knowledge; maybe it is time to take it more seriously. In order to grasp whatever is taught by modal and speculative knowledge, one needs to rebuild the predictive content given by a modal statement inside a norm or a theory about our way of knowing it (a transcendental theory). It is the only way to get a grasp on the *instantiating value* of that theoretical knowledge (its value as an ideal or possible specification). The transcendental theoretical awareness is how one can give the speculation and intuitive feature that respects its fine-grained content. Kant's answer since the beginning was to invoke the *Copernican Revolution*. Whatever can be known in those hyper-speculative fields is known only as a feature of human experience and never has the mark of the *thing in itself*. Once a statement with a defined modal profile contributes to the truth of a theory, I may have found its temporary contribution subjectively, but one cannot use it in a constitutive judgment to prove an *end in nature.*

To represent that fine-grained knowledge, I need to generate *apperceptive concepts*, such as "I think" or "is," that characterize the identity of the cognitive position of predictive knowledge about the empirical world. The modal profile of that knowledge will serve the purpose of the apperceptive representation. It will not exist by itself, like a rigid "trans-world identity." It is a modal profile that persists only as long as the spontaneity of the act that generates it persists. It persists in a non-realist state. Such is the message of Transcendental Idealism. So, the discernible part of non-universal knowledge is contained by the categories that generate the limits of what can be autonomously and spontaneously generated. The result of this is a reflective-conscious grasp of *what is known*.

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