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Interrogating Epistemic Internalism and Externalism within the Framework of Integrative Humanism

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ABSTRACT

Internalism and externalism are theories discussed in moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, sociology, economics, and some other disciplines within the humanities, hence the prefix “epistemic”. Epistemologists of diverse schools of thought and orientations have discussed internalism and externalism from the purview of the Gettier problem, reliabilism, naturalised epistemology and, in fact, the issue of justification in general. They all deserve appreciation for their noble inputs towards expanding the horizon of epistemic discourse. It has been argued by Steve that internalism and externalism are contemporary issues in epistemology that have nothing to do with either the classical, medieval or contemporary epochs of philosophical inquiry. This work strongly holds a contrary view, because every epistemic theory or concept proximately or remotely has something that ties it together with the already existing ones. No epistemic theory has ever held sway without reference to other already existing theories either as a critique, a criticism, an appraisal, or a review. The primary concern of this research is to have a shot at internalism and externalism as a contemporary advancement of rationalism and empiricism and then systematise the ideas within the purview of integrative humanism. It is with this mindset of epistemic harmonisation that *ratio-internalist and empirico-externalist spirito-centrism* is made possible. This understanding of our epistemic folkways is construed as a new way of grappling with the missing link between rationalism and internalism and between empiricism and externalism - all deriving a new impetus in the light of the integrativist approach to knowledge.

Keywords: Epistemic internalism; Epistemic externalism; Integrative Humanism; *spirito-centrism*; Integrativism.

INTRODUCTION

Internalism and externalism are theories also discussed in ethics as a branch of philosophy, philosophy of mind, sociology, economics and some other fields of study within the cycle of Arts and Humanities. That is why the need for the prefix – “epistemic” in the title of this work. Internalism and externalism have been construed in various ways by scholars of diverse schools of thought and orientations within the purview of epistemology (Akwaji & Nchua 2018). Some hold that epistemic internalism and externalism are offshoots of reliabilism as an epistemological theory, while others conceive that they are among important issues for debate in epistemology orchestrated by the Gettier problem. Some other thinkers strongly hold that internalism and externalism are fundamental, especially within the 21st-century debate on the issue of epistemic justification. All these justifications are very relevant and central in contemporary epistemic discourse. Broad as they are, the issues of internalism and externalism are also discussed from naturalized epistemology, especially with particular reference to the problem of *a priori* knowledge and the problem of induction. This must have been one of the reasons why Wrenn holds that,

The debate between internalists and externalists concerns whether anything besides mental states helps to constitute the justification of beliefs. Internalists hold that a belief is justified only if it is appropriately related to other mental states, and externalists hold that justification comes at least partly from elsewhere, for example from the reliability of the process that generated a belief (Poston n.p)

Among naturalistic epistemologists who endorse internalism are Donald Davidson and John Pollock. Davidson’s naturalism is fairly weak, in the sense that Davidson does not directly apply much hard science on epistemological problems. Nevertheless, he does take seriously Quine’s admonition that epistemology is just one part of our theory of the world, and he feels free to take for granted such things as the existence of the external world when it comes to explaining how we could have knowledge concerning the external world. He also holds that only another belief can justify a belief, and he thus sees justification as arising from the relationships among one’s beliefs (Poston, n.p).

Pollock (2012) endorses a view he calls “norm internalism”. He holds that beliefs are justified when formed in accord with curtailed internalized rules concerning the correct ways to form beliefs. Those internalized rules are, in his term, “psychologically real” contingent features of our cognitive architecture. Nevertheless, he also thinks that experimental studies of reasoning will not be very helpful in determining the contents of the internalized rules. Rather, he thinks the best way to learn their contents is by examining our intuitions about what counts as knowledge or justified belief and what does not (Poston, n.p).

On the other hand, it is important to note that naturalised epistemology strictly speaking is not committed to either internalism or externalism. According to Poston, “Many, perhaps most naturalistic epistemologists endorse reliabilist theories of justification or knowledge, and so they are externalists. Goldman in particular has been a standard-bearer for externalism” (IEP). It has to be recalled that after the renaissance interlude where Bacon and the like of Copernicus and Galileo flourished, the modern epoch witnessed a great bifurcation of views as it concerns the source of human knowledge. The rationalists led by Descartes and the empiricists led by Locke went their ways, which Kant tried to harmonise. In

the contemporary era, the internalists and the externalists widened the already existing chasm in a variety of ways. Descartes, the rationalist, had despised experience, and Bacon, the empiricist, had despised mathematics; but Locke aims to show that while the reason is the instrument of science, demonstration its form, and the realm of knowledge wider than experience, yet this instrument and this form are dependent for their content on a supply of material from the senses (Falckenberg 1989, p. 156).

Having seen the variegated approach of the internalists and the externalists views which could be likened to the impasse between the rationalists and the empiricists whose ideas they advanced, it becomes of importance to note that the major concern of this work is to find out whether internalism and externalism can be rightly referred to as a contemporary advancement of rationalism and an empiricism discourse of the 21st century, respectively; and then interrogate it with the notion of integrativism to find out whether integrative humanism as a philosophy and a method of philosophy can grapple with the cacophony between the epistemic positions. It also has to be noted from the outset that though this work is advancing a synergy between internalism and externalism from the perspective of integrative humanism, some ideas will be extrapolated from integrative epistemology which is a by-product of integrative humanism. In integrative epistemology, we are talking of seeking knowledge from wholly contextual and integrated points of view. We know from the absolute, relative, objective, subjective points of view. However, our view is that all human knowledge should draw insight from both the spiritual and physical dimensions of reality to attain the most comprehensive and reliable versions of knowledge that the context can yield (Ozumba 2010, p. 12).

This work strongly holds that epistemic internalism and externalism are proximately or remotely advancing the frontiers of rationalism and empiricism within the context of contemporary/21st century epistemic discourse. This work construes that Steve must have been highly influenced by the postmodernist deconstructionist approach to philosophy because no scholar argues from nowhere. Integrative humanism strongly abhors postmodernism both as a movement and as a philosophy, perhaps, because of their radical approach to philosophy which is outside the province of the 'spiritual'. Following such a philosophy will lead to a pitfall. The founder and chief exponent of integrativism write, "I was provoked into the philosophy of integrative humanism by the dead-endism advocated by postmodernism" (Ozumba 2010, p. 13). It then implies that integrativism is anti-postmodernism that came to radicalise and revolutionalise established traditions in philosophy, especially foundationalism. Fortunately, integrative humanism contextually complements positions of diverse cultures and traditions like internalism and externalism intending to bring the best out of them. By so doing *ratio-internalist and empirico-externalist spirito-centrism* becomes a new way of understanding the synergy between rationalism and internalism, empiricism and externalism, which in the spirit of integrative humanism considers the spiritual dimension of man in particular and reality in general.

INTERNALISM: A CONTEMPORARY ADVANCEMENT OF RATIONALISM

It is important to note from the outset that internalism is an epistemological theory which also came into the philosophical lexicon as a reaction to the Gettier

problem. It has to be reiterated that this epistemic theory is encapsulated in 21st-century epistemology with its further variegated approach, nuances of expression and understanding from diverse schools of thought and orientations ranging from reliabilism, naturalistic epistemology, probabilism, and so forth. Internalism can be construed as a contemporary advancement or 21st-century continuation of rationalism championed by Rene Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz and Benedict Baruch Spinoza in the modern epoch of philosophical discourse. It has to be recalled that though Plato lived in the ancient era, however, he was a charter member of the rationalist school of thought.

Rationalism is an epistemological theory which holds that knowledge comes primarily from reason. This position is strongly held by all the thinkers of the rationalist school of thought. In their quest for knowledge, the rationalists downplayed sense experience as the primary source of human knowledge. They uphold intuition and reflection as veritable works done by the human reason in knowledge acquisition. Rationalism is the philosophical position that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge, or, more strongly, that it is the unique path to knowledge...In recent philosophical writing, the term 'rationalism' is most closely associated with the position of seventeenth-century philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and sometimes Malebranche. These thinkers are often referred to collectively as the Continental rationalists and are generally opposed to the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

On the other hand, the term internalism is derived from a root word 'internal' which means connected with the inside of something, that is, coming from within a thing itself rather than from outside it. In line with this analysis, the *Dictionary of Common Philosophical Terms* sees internalism as "the view that we directly experience the natural world in conscious states that can never be proven to relate to the external world in any objective way". This implies that the justification of one's experience is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person (Ojong and Ibrahim, 2011, p. 56).

Internalism maintains that the justifiability of a belief should be a function of our internal states. Beliefs are internal states, so doxastic theories are internalist theories. Internalists tend to emphasize our conscious internal access in relation to our beliefs. On this understanding of internalism, reflective, careful agents are able to make epistemological assessments of their beliefs. In *Theory of Knowledge*, Roderick Chisholm writes, "In making their assumptions, it presupposes that they are rational beings. This means, in part, that they have certain properties which are such that, if they ask themselves, with respect to any one of these properties, whether or not they have that property, then it will be evident to them that they have it. It means further that they are able to know what they think and believe and that they can recognize inconsistencies (1989, p. 5).

The idea behind internalism is that the justifiedness of a belief is determined by whether it was arrived at or is currently sustained by "correct cognitive process". The view is that being justified in holding a belief consists of conforming to epistemic norms, where the latter tells you "how to" acquire new beliefs and reject old ones. Internalist theories are committed to the principle that the correctness of an epistemic move (a cognitive process) is an inherent feature of it. For example, it may be claimed claim that reasoning in accordance with *modus ponens* is always correct, whereas arriving at beliefs through wishful thinking is always incorrect. This is implied by the claim that justifiability of a belief is a function of one's internal states because what that means is that we can vary

everything about the situation other than the internal states without affecting which beliefs are justifiable. In particular, varying contingent properties of the cognitive processes themselves will not affect whether a belief is justified. This is called *cognitive essentialism*. According to cognitive essentialism, the epistemic correctness of a cognitive process is an essential feature of that process and is not affected by contingent facts such as the reliability of the process in the actual world (Pollock and Cruz 2012, p. 25).

VERSIONS OF INTERNALISM

Epistemologists have approached internalism in diverse ways which include: Accessibilism, Deontological internalism, Mentalism, Reliabilist internalism, and so forth.

1. Accessibilism

This version of internalism holds that the epistemic justification of a person's belief is determined by or depends on things to which the person has some special sort of access to (Hatcher 2018). According to this view, every factor that determines whether one's belief is propositionally justified is reflectively accessible (Ojong and Ibrahim, 2011, p. 58). It is the position of the accessibility internalists that one could gain access to knowledge/justification introspectively or reflectively. It therefore follows that their positions are anchored on introspection or reflection, without which no knowledge claim can be made. For one to make any claim of knowledge, such knowledge must be reflectively or introspectively anchored. Here, knowledge without introspection or reflection can be likened to a wide goose chase.

2. Deontological Internalism

Ordinarily, deontologism as a philosophical theory falls with the ambiance of ethics. However, it is employed here in the epistemic divide of philosophical discourse instantiating the claim that integrativism is real and ongoing, especially within the context of twenty-first century philosophy. Deontological internalism is extrapolated and grafted into internalist epistemic discourse as a source of support based on the deontological character of justification. According to Ojong and Ibrahim,

"It is argued here that the language of 'justified' and 'unjustified' invokes concepts like rightness and wrongness, blameness and blameworthy and dutifulness and neglect...Thus, deontological internalism holds that the concept of epistemic justification is to be analyzed in terms of fulfilling one's intellectual duties or responsibilities. In other words, epistemic justification contains some deontic elements" (2011, p. 62).

The deontological internalists firmly hold that epistemic justification has to do with satisfying one's duty as a rational being so that a person's beliefs are justified to the extent that this duty has been fulfilled in accepting them.

3. Mentalism

The idea of mentalism as an offshoot of internalist epistemic theory is that a person's beliefs are justified only by things that are internal to the person's mental state. It then implies that what determines the justifiedness of a belief is one's internal state (Egeland 2019). Some of the notable scholars who hold this view

are Williamson (one of the chief exponents of mentalism), Pollock, Feldman and Conee (2012). In the words of Ojong and Ibrahim, "One of the advantages of mentalism is that it upholds a clear internalist thesis – justification is determined by one's mental states without appealing to the problematic notion of access.... The mentalist escapes this problem. One's mental state determines justification, and one does not explicate what one's mental states are by appealing to the problematic notion of access. However, mentalism does face the objection that since it preaches the notion of access it is not a genuine form of internalism (2011, p. 61).

4. Reliabilist Internalism

As an epistemic concept, reliabilism encompasses a broad range of epistemological theories that seek to explain knowledge/justification in terms of truth conductiveness of the process by which an agent forms a true belief. (Choi 2019). It is of importance to note that one of the reasons why the reliabilists were unable to grapple with the Gettier problem which they set out to address is because of their lack of integration. Reliabilists of the internalist and externalist orientations could not agree. The reliabilists of the internalist divide hold that internalism is a perspective that examines truth conduciveness as an internal process internal to the individual and is internally accessible through introspection or reflection. This could be done by an internal process focusing on what is in the consciousness-thoughts and other sensory impressions (Ozumba 2015, p. 170). Among the internalists, there is also a divergence in their approach which includes, accessibility internalism, which is concerned with the accessibility of the justifier to consciousness. But the question is: how readily are the justifiers accessible to consciousness? From another perspective, the deontological internalists construe justification as that which "has some internalist components because it seems related to a kind of control over beliefs that the epistemic agent may be thought to have" (Ojong and Ibrahim, 2011, p. 76).

EXTERNALISM: AN EMPIRICIST DISCOURSE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Externalism can be discussed in philosophy of mind, ethics, and epistemology. In the theory of knowledge, externalism is the view that a person might know something by being suitably situated with respect to it, without that relationship being in any sense within his purview. The view allows that you can know without being justified in believing that you know (Blackburn 1996, p. 133). Externalism, as an epistemological theory, is a contemporary advancement or 21st-century expansion of empiricism whose chief exponents are John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Thus, externalism accounts for justification in a way that minimizes the importance of your reasons and your evidence for a belief. Ex implies that what justifies your belief is not any mentally accessible reasons or evidence that you have for the belief (Hetherington 1996, p. 82). Externalism is not only the denial of internalism but also an extension of the empiricists' approach to knowledge in the modern era. In the words of Pollock and Cruz:

Externalism is the denial of internalism. According to externalism, more than just the internal states of the believer enter into the justification of beliefs. A wide variety of externalist theories are possible. What we might call *process externalism* agrees with the

internalist that the epistemic worth of a belief should be determined by the cognitive processes from which it issues, but it denies cognitive essentialism according to which the correctness of a cognitive process is an essential property of it (Strathern 1998, p. 26).

A different kind of externalist theory is probabilism, which assesses beliefs in terms of their probability of being true. Probabilism makes no explicit appeal to the cognitive pedigree of a belief, although the probability of a belief being true can of course be indirectly influenced by the cognitive process from which it derives... One of the attractions of externalist theories is that they hold out promise for integrating epistemic norms into a naturalistic picture of human beings.... Externalist theories have seemed to provide the only possible candidates for naturalistic reductions of epistemic norms, so this has made them attractive in the eyes of many philosophers. Externalist theories are automatically non-doxastic theories. That is, they take the justifiability of a belief to be a function more than just one's total doxastic state. This will prove to be a source of difficulty for externalist theories (Strathern 1998, p. 27).

VARIOUS STRANDS OF EXTERNALISM

1. Reliabilist Externalism

Notable among the reliabilists of the externalist divide are Alvin Goldman and John Pollock. On the other hand, reliabilists of the externalist background are concerned with non-introspective knowledge and the extent to which the knowledge that is to be grounded conduces to common sense or scientific evidence as a warrant for reliability (Leplin 2007). It is on this basis that some externalists like Alvin Goldman think that common sense evidence is sufficient for justification, while others like John Pollock strongly oppose it and advocates scientific evidence as a warrant for justification. For the externalists, justification is exclusively an external process, which this research considers could be analogically likened to the verifiability principles of the logical empiricists. The question is: How verifiable is common sense, and scientific evidence?

2. Common Sense Externalism

When a philosophical reflection is carried out with particular reference to common sense, G.E. Moore easily comes to mind. It is the position of common sense externalists that common-sense experience is enough to justify knowledge claim. That is, knowledge can be justified common sensically without reference to the rigors of extra mental reasoning (Ghenea 2015). For instance, Moore argues that it is common sense knowledge that he has two hands. It is Moore's position that things can exist unperceived at least in relative terms.

3. Scientific Approach Externalism

Science is an organised body of facts, or knowledge that can be proved by testing or experimentation. Scientific approach externalists are of the view that for anything to be justified as knowledge it must pass through the crucibles of observation and verification (Pace Giannotta 2016). It is on this basis that scholars like A.J Ayer and the other logical positivists, who argue that verifiability is a *conditio sine qua non* for knowledge claims can be regarded as externalists of the scientific approach.

INTEGRATIVE HUMANISM: A NOVEL INSIGHT IN CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE

The Philosophy and Method of Integrative Humanism which was first published in 2010 and still on-going is the brainchild, fruit of hard work and resilience from the novel intellectual insight and assemblage of the sophomore, an avid reader, a great researcher and a scintillating scholar of high intensity of adroit ingenuity, Prof. Godfrey Okechukwu Ozumba. Integrative humanism is simply defined as a ratio-spirito-centric approach in understanding human existence, interpreting human affairs, and a rigorous philosophical attitude which takes into consideration, the spiritual and the mundane philosophizing from the point of view of holistic truth bearing in mind that man is both mortal and immortal, terrestrial and preternatural, spirit and body (Ozumba 2019, p. 22).

Philosophy generally deals with a reality that has a multi-dimensional approach and points of reference, not without the inevitable tools of logic, reflection, criticality, systematization of thoughts and codification of ideas (Edor 2017; Ogar & Edor 2020). Integrative humanism on the other hand aims at the unification of the vast expanse of reality by way of harmonizing matter and spirit and diverse constituents of reality, open even to objective criticism and suggestions to better the lot of humanity. It is unlike Richard Rorty's idea of "anything goes"; whatever should be integrated must have the characteristics for which philosophy is known. The methodological demands of integrative humanism are contextual, analytic, complementary and mutual integration. Therefore integrative humanism is cautious management of relevant variables in a context-dependent dynamic network for resolutions of tasks that would rather prove difficult for mono-sequestered and non-contextualized theoretic frameworks. It further bridges the gap between one culture and another, and between one philosophical tradition and another (Ozumba, 2010, p. 27).

IN DEFENSE OF INTEGRATIVE HUMANISM

It has often been queried that what integrative humanism as a philosophy and method of philosophising professes is not new that, it is the same old wine in a new wineskin. That is not completely true; and integrative humanism seeks the truth that is comprehensively arrived at. There is something significantly new in integrative humanism. Experience has shown that what has successfully sustained philosophy right from the earliest times until this contemporary era is that no philosopher holds a position from nowhere. It is definitely in appraising already existing works and coming up with new positions that will be further critiqued and critically examined that the frontiers and horizon of knowledge is expanded.

Integrative humanism is like the Biblical "stone that the builders rejected which later became the chief cornerstone" (Ps. 118:22; Acts 4: 11). During the Renaissance interlude, the great scientists like Bacon, Copernicus and Galileo who came into philosophy with scientific bias envisaged and actually advanced philosophical ideas that downplayed the philosophical postulates of the medieval and scholastic thinkers who were 'integrativistic' in their approach to knowledge. The spiritual had an upper hand in the scholastics' quest for knowledge and there was no chasm between faith, reason and experience in their knowledge justifications. No wonder St. Anselm of Canterbury strongly conceived God as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (Ezenwanne, 2017, p. 278), going spiritual while approaching the issue of the knowledge of God.

Some scholars have construed that there is perhaps nothing new in the philosophy and method of integrative humanism, if not for the manipulation of concepts to make it look as if it is a new idea in the philosophical discipline. This work strongly holds that there is significantly something new in integrative humanism. In response to this Ozumba writes, "Our concepts 'spiritocentric' and 'humanism' may not be new terms in the philosophical and literary vocabulary of our time. What is new is the emphasis, the articulating into a philosophical framework, a method and a propaedeutic for all intellectual engagements" (2010, p. 38). Ozumba is the first to employ the terms together - "integrative humanism" in philosophical discourse (Edet 2013). Similarly, this is the first time a philosophical theory is espoused both as a philosophy and a method of philosophizing, and the chief exponent and founder of the theory is doing his best to defend it. This is a remarkable contribution to knowledge in the history of philosophy, especially in the epistemic domain both in Africa and in the West. It is also remarkable to acknowledge the humility of the author of integrativism who rightly admits that everything has not been said that "integrative humanism is ongoing" (Ozumba 2010). Again, some scholars have gone as far as arguing that integrative humanism is a mere rehearsal of complementary reflection. Ozumba makes this known when he writes,

We have been accused of rehearsing Asouzu's Complementary Reflection. This I have roundly refuted in several works Being an integrativist philosophy is not averse to any progressive philosophy, but must be reconstructed to admit the temporal and spiritual dimensions of reality. At this point, we capture the background and formulation of our philosophy of integrative humanism (2010, p. 14).

Right from the pre-Socratic period, the golden era, modern, medieval, renaissance interlude and contemporary epoch, philosophers have always referred to the already existing ideas to espouse and advance their own. Thales of Miletus, for instance, noted that everything was in 'flux' and advocated "water" as the primary stuff of all things, Anaximenes advocated "air", for Heraclitus, it was "fire" which he called (the One), and Empedocles integrated the positions his predecessors above, after his own contribution – "earth". He tried to reconcile the theories of Heraclitus that everything changes with that of Parmenides that there is no change, that nothing comes into being and nothing goes out of being. Empedocles maintained that there were four eternal elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water (Omoregbe 2003, p. 18). This is integrativism and complementarity at work.

Taking the renaissance period as another case in point, it was a time in the history of philosophy with a renewed interest in the ancient works with a new vision towards a scientific approach to philosophy. Towards the end of the renaissance, the voyage for reviving the past philosophies began to subside: instead, there began to appear "new" philosophies and "new" systems of thought proudly announced as such, for instance, the *Nova de Universis Philosophia* offered by Francesco Patrizzi or the *Great Instauration* (explicitly opposed to a "restoration") of Francis Bacon. However, most of these efforts at original creation clearly bear the stamp of some ancient sect or sects of philosophy. Even Nicholas of Cusa, the most original systematic mind of the Renaissance, could be called (and indeed once called himself) a Pythagorean. Philosophers hardly ever make a complete break with the past, even when they most loudly claim to be

doing so. The great merit of the Renaissance was that thinkers learned what they could from the school of Athens and brought what they learned to bear with fresh vigor upon the problems of human life (Edwards 2014).

The spiritual dimension of integrativism was earlier hinted on by the scholastics in the medieval era, but with the coming of Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, and other scientifically oriented thinkers of the renaissance and the mathematical approach of Descartes and company in the modern era, the spiritual dimension of reality was downplayed if not completely jettisoned in the quest for knowledge. Worse still, the postmodernist thinkers through their deconstructionist approach, radicalisation and revolutionisation of ideas also brought in a strong setback in *spirito-centric* approach to knowledge. Today, integrative humanism with its spirito-centric aura holds sway such that an academic journal of international repute has been dedicated towards its advancement.

Similarly, some scholars have questioned the inclusion of spiritual or spirito-centric dimensions in epistemological discourse. The straightforward response to this is that all branches of philosophy are in one way or the other interconnected. For example, in the traditional understanding of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), which was almost the dogma of knowledge before the arrival of Gettier with his counterexamples; the only epistemic constituent of the tripartite definition of knowledge is 'justification' (Ogar & Edor 2020). 'Truth' is a metaphysical concept and at best semantic, while 'belief' is a psychological notion and at best theological or religious. The implication of this is that philosophy remains the mother of all sciences and arts and is not in any way averse to concepts from her baby disciplines. The concepts of truth and belief are not evaluative. In the field of philosophy, there is the philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of economics, philosophy of Law, and so forth. And so, employing the spiritual and also citing Sacred Writs in integrative humanism is not out of place.

It is my strong view of integrative humanism that all our knowledge should be geared towards the advancement of the human condition. Often, that is not the case with some philosophies of the world. The scientific knowledge that led to the discovery of mass destruction like the Corona Virus (Covid-19) pandemic allegedly manufactured in China and employed towards the destruction of life gives more insight than the spirito-centric dimension of knowledge cannot be over-emphasized. There is no spirituality and understanding of man as a temporal and spiritual being in the scientific discovery that led to such an inhuman and ungodly approach towards knowledge of such a scientific discovery and its experimentation. No wonder Ozumba describes man as, "the agent, the agenda and the agency of knowledge...as the means and end, the subject and the predicate of knowledge" (2015, p. 40).

Plato employed the idea of the allegory of the cave in the classical epoch, while Bacon used the idea of the idols of the cave (*idola spectus*) during the renaissance period. As it were, Bacon's idol of the cave is the reminiscence of Plato's allegory of the cave where individuals are circumvented in the cave and by the cave knowing only customs of their environment; each individual has his own cave which determines his level of enlightenment. What Plato communicates in his idea of an allegory of the cave is that those that see shadows, the ephemeral and the fluxing things of this world think that the sensible things of this world are real and as such contented. This allegory shows that there is a world of shadow

and a world of reality. Bacon's idol of the cave has it that individuals are shut in their caves and being limited to the kind of books they read, the idea they consider relevant and the intellectual authorities they hold in high esteem. This idol leads men to look for sciences in their own narrow world instead of in the larger world. The point remains that Bacon got some inspiration from Plato and enlarged it.

Plato argued in the ancient era that the objects of our knowledge are things in the world of Forms. St. Augustine appropriated this idea when he argued that, "The objects of our knowledge are not the material things of this world, but the eternal ideas in the Mind of God". Thus Augustine, Christianising Plato's world of Forms, interprets the world of Forms as the Mind of God, and the Forms are the eternal ideas in the Mind of God.... Bonaventure was a Christian philosopher of the Augustinian tradition. But in his epistemology, he combined Augustinians with Aristotelianism. The human mind according to him, is a *tabula rasa* (a blank slate) at birth, with no innate ideas in it except two... namely, the knowledge of the existence of God and that of moral virtues (Omogrebe 2003, p. 71).

It is important to note also at this point that St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest philosopher in the Middle-Ages complemented the insights employed by Aristotle and St. Bonaventure in his epistemic ideas. For Aquinas, there are no innate ideas; at birth, the human mind is a *tabula rasa*, all knowledge comes from sense perception. This led him to argue: *nihil est intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensus* (there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses). To be noted is that the empiricists namely, Locke, Hume and Berkeley later in the modern era appropriated the line of thought of Aristotle, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas that there are no innate ideas.

The idea of the noumenal world and the phenomenal world introduced by Kant in his Copernican revolution is not a new thing in epistemology. What is actually new are the words he employed - noumena and phenomena, which for him are things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us respectively. According to Kant, things, as they are (noumena), cannot be known, while things, as they appear to us (phenomena), can be known. Again, looking closely at Plato in the ancient era, he divided the world into two namely, intelligible and sensible worlds. Plato construed that we cannot know the sensible world because knowledge entails certainty and immutability. For him, we can only have knowledge of objects in the intelligible world, which he referred to as 'forms'. By implication, what is the sensible world for Plato is the phenomenal world for Kant, while the intellectual world (the real world) for Plato is the noumenal (things as they are) world for Kant. G.E. Moore employed the idea of common sense in the contemporary era, but St. Bonaventure had earlier employed it in the era of scholasticism (medieval period) when he was analyzing how knowledge is acquired. According to Bonaventure, "Objects impress themselves on the sense organ during sense-perception. common sense synthesizes the different sensations and stores it up in the imagination...." (Omogrebe 2003, p. 73). Aquinas also employed common sense in his analysis of four innate sense postulated by him. G.E. Moore came up in the contemporary epoch and articulated a work, *In Defense of Common Sense*. In fact, Moore is known for his empiricist view of "common sense" more than Bonaventure, Aquinas, or even Aristotle, whose tradition Bonaventure and Aquinas adopted. Using Leibniz as another case in point, Ozumba and Ukah (2012) aver, Leibniz's philosophy is... highly eclectic. It is chiefly welding together of preceding philosophies. In his epistemology, he is seen using Aristotle's 'potentiality and

actuality'. In his proof of the existence of God, he draws largely from Descartes and the scholastics. In his monadology, he is found to have adopted the theory of monadology of Democritus (Ozumba and Ukah 2012, p. 4). Employing all these philosophies has not in any way diminished the idea that “monad” is a term for which among other things, Leibniz is known in the philosophical world.

One interesting thing is that in all these none of the scholars who made reference to the past employing and advancing the ideas of their predecessors stopped at that. Each of them made their own inputs showing clearly that philosophy is indeed a living discipline. For Plato - Forms, justified true belief (JTB), for Aristotle – philosophy of essence ‘in a new way’ (which was first used by Plato), for Augustine - Divine illumination, for Bonaventure - innatism of only knowledge of God and moral virtues, for Aquinas – *quin qui via* (five ways), for Descartes - *cogito ergo sum*, for Kant - *synthetic a priori*, for Bacon - *novum organon and distempers of learning*, for Copernicus - heliocentric view of the universe to mention just a few, and for Ozumba integrative humanism. All these go a long way to instantiate the claim that nothing is so new in our philosophical discourse that nobody has said or done something that is closely related to it in the past. Again, that does not preclude the fact of the newness of each scholar’s contribution to knowledge be it a word, a phrase, a sentence, or a philosophical theory. And most importantly there must be cross-pollination and crisscrossing of ideas harmonising faith, reason, and even experience all together for the service of a man who is inevitably expected to give account temporarily and spiritually. In integrative humanistic discourse, “Our position is that for knowledge to be consummated, then, there is a need for a conflation of reason and faith. When we seek the truth only through reason, we are bound to get stuck somewhere. But faith provides us with the wings with which to cross the borders of phenomenality into the domain of reality” (Ozumba 2010, p. 86).

UNDERSTANDING INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INTEGRATIVE HUMANISM

It is the position of integrative humanism that philosophical theories, schools of thought and orientations should be grappled with within the context of human interest treating a man as a temporal and an eternal being. Here, man is at the centre of all intellectual activities. This idea of spirito-centric humanism considers the spiritual component of reality. From the argument of the internalists and the externalists, the intellectual and experiential dimensions of man are emphasised without reference to the spiritual perspective. This study strongly maintains that all the epochs of epistemic discourse have significant contributions to make in understanding internalism and externalism, especially as it is discussed within the purview of integrative humanism. It is from the idea of the rationalists and empiricists successes and shortcomings that the exponents and other members of the internalist and externalist schools of thought and orientations espoused their thoughts and advance their ideas, respectively. It is in the spirit of integrative humanism that knowledge is pursued and advanced holistically not losing sight of the spiritual dimension of man, who is a composite of body, soul, and spirit. There are always strong hiccups and setbacks when reason alone or reason and experience are emphasized at the expense of faith and the spiritual. In Ozumba’s words:

Philosophical orientations for the most part end up in agnosticism if they try to pursue their goal solely, from the point of view of

reason. Kant tried and ended up in phenomena and had to accept the impermeableness of the noumena. Husserl tried through phenomenology and ended up equating appearances with reality (2010, p. 86).

From the above, it becomes apparent that conceptualising the dynamics of internalism and externalism within the confines of integrativism cannot but carry along with it the spiritual. Epistemic synergy cannot be over-emphasised. Faith, reason and experience must cohere to make headway. It has to be pointed out that language remains a problem or a challenge in our quest for knowledge. The linguistic challenge is such that in analysing and describing our perception, we employ different languages because it is natural that we perceive the same reality from variegated perspectives. The fact remains that the problem of relativism has not left us since the time of Protagoras of Abdera. It is, therefore, within the framework of integrative humanism that internalism advancing rationalism becomes ratio-internalist, and also in the same spirit of integrativism externalism expanding the frontiers of empiricism becomes empirico-externalist in their approach to knowledge. Epistemic goals have to be pursued with critical, creative and caring thinking (CCCT). This idea I shall develop in my subsequent work. It has to be recalled that internalists and externalists have conducted their debate on the assumption that man is on his own either introspectively/intuitively or experientially/experimentally. In the spirit of integrative humanism it should not be (either/or), but both introspectively/intuitively and experientially/experimentally that reality can be better grappled with not losing sight of the spiritual (supernatural/revealed dimension of truth). It is on that note that this work holds *ratio-internalist and empirico-externalist spirito-centrism* (RIEES) as a new approach to knowledge with a view to eternity as a way of interrogating epistemic internalism and externalism integratively. It is so because it is in the understanding of the thought pattern of integrativism that this life is not all that man has to contend with and man is responsible both to himself, his fellow human beings (the society) and to God. What this work is trying to arrive at is that everything does not end with man. This is against the notion that "man is on his own, that this life is all that he has to contend with, and we are responsible to ourselves (Blackburn 1996, p. 13). This is in line with the orientation that, "Philosophy must go beyond the explication of concepts to show how the concepts bear some relevance to man's existential situation as "being unto eternity" (Ozumba 2010, p. 89).

There are some basic features of rationalism which are clearly evident in internalism, and there are also some distinguishing characteristics of empiricism the externalists hold so dear and espouse with a new vigor and renewed interest. The issues of intuition, introspection and the preeminence of reason over and above sense experience are commonly held by almost all the rationalists right from the time of Plato who can be properly identified as a charter member of the rationalist school of thought. Again, the empiricists strongly emphasise leadership of sense experience and experiential approach to knowledge over and above reason. The empiricists had earlier described the human mind as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) right from birth.

Internalism emphasises human reason, intuition and introspection. It is a reasonable and sound argument that knowledge can be gained intuitively and introspectively, but that does not in any way come close to arriving at holistic knowledge. From another perspective, externalism holds so tenaciously sense

experience, the world of physical existence, and experimentation. It is also sound reasoning to hold that some of our knowledge of reality is experiential and at times verifiable. However, just like rationalism and empiricism, with Kant's *synthetic a priori*, both internalism and externalism fail to include the spiritual dimension of reality in their cognitive schemes. When a man is viewed as a being unto eternity, it is then that the preternatural and supernatural divides of his being will be better appreciated. It is so because every knowledge whether from the perspective of the internalists or the externalists is geared towards the good of man. The missing link in the spiritual dimension of knowledge which none of the epistemic divides carried along as they espoused and advanced their ideas. This is beyond Richard Rorty's "anything goes" because integrative humanism strongly holds that there is a need to give account if not here, hereafter. By implication, nothing will be neglected or overlooked, especially the spiritual. St. Paul strongly emphasized that it is the spirit and the spiritual that is more profitable. The intergrativist thinkers would also insist that nothing in the real sense of integration is useless or meaningless.

CONCLUSION

From the above analysis, it has been clearly shown that no epistemic idea in particular or philosophical theory, in general, emanates from a vacuum. Every new epistemic idea or philosophical theory arises either as a reaction or a response to the already existing ones and the schools of thought that espouse them. This shows that in formulating and espousing epistemic cum philosophical theories, there is always an isomorphic string between the past and the present, and then envisaging the future. It is chiefly because philosophy with its various strands remains a living discipline. Such is the case with epistemic internalism and externalism which have been interrogated within the framework of integrative humanism. The mathematical and scientific influence of the Renaissance interlude to philosophy is demonstrated in the two great philosophical traditions of the modern era namely, rationalism and empiricism. Internalism is a contemporary advancement of rationalism, while externalism is an empiricist discourse of the 21st century. The former adopted the mathematical method demonstrated in the epistemic postulates of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz and in the contemporary epoch appropriated and advanced by the internalists, while the latter employed the empirical/scientific approach as exemplified in the epistemic ideas of Locke, Berkeley and Hume and the 21st century employed and expanded by the externalists.

Kant did a great work in synergizing between rationalism and empiricism with his famous *synthetic a priori*. However, it has to be recalled that long before Kant, the idea of integrating philosophical ideas has been there along the ages with Empedocles in the ancient era integrating water, air, and fire, which were the views of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, respectively and then added 'earth' (his original contribution) as the primary stuff of things. In the medieval period, Bonaventure, who was of the Augustinian tradition, combined both Augustinian and Aristotelian views in his epistemic discourse to instantiate the claim that integrativism and complementarity had been part of the scheme in philosophical inquiry right from the earliest times. All the above does not in any way preclude the fact that integrative humanism espoused by Ozumba is, indeed, novel, unique and insightful accepting and uniting all diverse terrains of knowledge as important without losing sight of the spiritual dimension of man

who is seeking knowledge, which is still ongoing. Every philosopher's position contains a modicum of truth, though some are more convincing than others. I then figured that truth must be a phenomenon with many colours, phases, faces, dimensions, contexts and genres. I decided that to avoid half-truth we must adopt a system of philosophy that must aspire to comprehensivism, eclecticism, hotchpochism and integrativism. Truth, for me, becomes conceptualized conceptual milestones integratively periscoped (Ozumba 2010, p. 13).

In the light of the philosophy and method of integrative humanism, it is the position of this research that there is a missing link in all that the ratio-internalist and empirico-externalist thinkers did, even with Kant's synthesis in the modern era; that is, the spiritual dimension of reality which they failed to consider. Man is a trio dimensional entity made up of body, mind, and spirit. Every philosophising should revolve around man who is a being of both preternatural and supernatural existence. Employing the words of Ozumba, "Man, in integrative humanism, is "a being unto eternity". So, knowledge has to be purposive. This means that man has to afford himself all kinds of knowledge that will be instrumental in fostering a congenial earthly and eternal existence. Man is a tripartite being; he has a mind, a spirit and body. And these three dimensions supply him with the knowledge or, rather, elicit for him knowledge relevant to his being" (Ozumba 2010, p. 47). In general, it has been observed that every vantage position cannot be outrightly nonsensical, it will definitely have something sensible to communicate; each view has some element of truth or reality to present when approached integratively synergizing the diverse positions to arrive at knowledge. And if that is done the internalists and the externalists with the rationalists and the empiricists whose ideas they advanced more vigorously will synergise their views and come up with ratio-internalist and empirico-externalist spirito-centrism (RIEES). In the light of integrative humanism, human reason, sense perception and the spiritual dimensions of reality must all be considered in a harmonious manner if the internalists and the externalists will make any headway in their quest for knowledge.

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