



ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A Critical Analysis of the Three Conditions of Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

In analyzing the three different conditions of knowledge, in this work, we find that Truth as a necessary condition of knowledge ultimately amounts to a minimal conception of truth. That is if S knows that p is true, then, p is true. Secondly, we find that Belief as a necessary condition of knowledge is not used in a metaphoric sense of ‘belief’. Also, that it neither entertains the performative sense of knowledge nor does it allow us to interpret a guess as an instance of knowledge. Either of the two might lead to arguing for knowledge without belief. Belief is taken in such a sense that it necessarily follows from the knowledge and, accordingly, the condition can be stated as that if S knows that p, then, S believes that p. Third, this paper finds out that the main objective of keeping Justification as a necessary condition of knowledge is to distinguish knowledge from accidental true beliefs. Every instance of knowledge necessarily satisfies that the subject has enough evidence to be justified in what he/she believes to be true. In other words, if S knows that p, then, S is justified in believing that p. Also, in this work, I explained that there is no satisfactory answer to Gettier’s problem, hence, there is no necessity of identifying knowledge with Justified True Belief.

Keywords: Truth Condition; Belief Condition; Justification Condition.

INTRODUCTION

Truth Condition, Belief Condition and Justification Condition are the three conditions of knowledge. Looking into the three different conditions of knowledge, we can find the significance of the justification condition. Our understanding of justification’s significance will have its bearing on our understanding of foundationalism as a theory of justification. If S knows P, then it is true that p is true. This is precisely what we mean by the truth condition of knowledge. If John knows that the sky is blue, the sky is indeed blue. Is it possible for John to know that the sky is blue if the sky is not blue? No. Because,

had it been possible, knowledge could not have guaranteed truth. If it is false that p is true, then S cannot know that p is true. The belief condition of knowledge states that if S knows p, then S believes that p is true. S cannot claim to know that p is true and, at the same time, claim that S does not believe that p.

Justification-condition is basically meant for the prevention of accidental true beliefs becoming knowledge (Bolisani & Bratianu 2018). As what S believes may just happen to be true and S may not have any reason or evidence to claim that p, S may have the accidental true belief that p, without knowing that p. If S knows that p, S must have some justification behind his belief that p, and such a justified true belief that p is not an accidental true belief. If we go by the traditional definition of knowledge, a justified true belief that p amounts to knowledge that p. The truth condition of knowledge is directly related to the conception of knowledge as recognition of correct information. To know that p, S must get p right. That is, p must be true if p to be known. The necessity of truth for knowledge can be well captured through a question form. Put any proposition p, if p is false, nobody can genuinely ask you do you know that p? The question 'Do you know that p?' presupposes that P is true. An answer to this question also presupposes that it is true that p is true. If it is false that p is true, S cannot genuinely answer that S knows that p is true. That is, no subject can ever know something false. If a subject knows that p then it is true that p. When truth condition suggests that genuine knowledge must be correct information, belief condition suggests that genuine knowledge must be held by a genuine subject. That is, a subject believes that he holds correct information when he gives us the correct information. If he does not believe but gives us the correct information that p, he does not know that p. For example, I cannot know that the earth is round if I do not believe that the earth is round, even if I tell it hundred times that the earth is round. The justification condition suggests that knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true beliefs. In other words, knowledge is not just a genuine subject's correct information; nor is it a piece of lucky correct information. The subject must have adequate justification for that correct information such that the correct information cannot be counted as a piece of lucky correct information. The Three conditions of knowledge are not as simple as we have just introduced. Let us consider them separately in three different sections and explore them further.

TRUTH CONDITION

Truth is a necessary condition of knowledge (Hazlett 2018). If S knows that p is true, then it is true that p is true. It is not acceptable that S knows that p is true, but it is false that p is true. For example, it is false that Samuel Obasanjo is the present president of Nigeria. Hence, for no subject, it is possible to know that Samuel Obasanjo is the present president of Nigeria. If anyone believes that Samuel Obasanjo is the present president of Nigeria, he has a false belief and his false belief cannot be counted as an instance of knowledge. Every instance of knowledge is an instance of truth. There are different theories of truth and different problems related to these theories. Therefore, we should make it clear what we mean by 'true' when we consider truth a necessary condition

of knowledge and assert that If S knows that p, then, it is true that p. Aristotle says, ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say what is that it is, and what is not that it is not, is true’ (Chisholm 1989, p. 89). Here Aristotle compares reality with what is said about reality. Truth is a match between the two and falsehood a mismatch. This is fundamental to the correspondence theory of truth. One might say that Socrates is pale and that Socrates is a father. The first is true because Socrates is pale and the second is false because he is not a father. In other words, a sentence S is true if and only if S corresponds to the facts.

In accordance with this theory, ‘The sky is blue’ is true because the fact is that the sky is blue (Bunge 2012). As a rival to a correspondence theory of truth, the Coherence theory of truth does not permit the determination of truth in terms of correspondence (Alcoff 2018). In accordance with this theory, a sentence is true only if it coheres with all other sentences of a system. The idea is that truth does not depend on a relation between language and reality but only upon the relation among sentences (Guihot 2019). This is formulated as S is true in L if and only if S coheres with other sentences of L. Coherence is a relation among propositions, not a relation between a proposition and something else, like a state-of-affairs which is not a proposition. Truth is based on an internal harmony of the propositions in a definite system. A group of propositions is not coherent unless each of them supports the other. What is common to both of the above two rival theories is that they presume that truth is indifferent to practical life and, thereby, not associated with the beliefs of any individual’s practical life but with the sentences. On the other hand, a pragmatic theory of truth counts beliefs, not the sentences, to be the carriers of truth and, secondly, the belief’s truth is determined only in relation to the actions of practical life (Capps 2017). A belief is true if and only if it is a genuine basis of action. A belief that has no role in our pragmatic life is a false belief. Such a belief does not motivate us to act in any way. The above three theories of truth are different attempts to answer why or how a sentence or belief becomes true. Strictly speaking, they are not the different definitions of truth. In a sense, they are just meant to verify whether a sentence or belief is true or false. Now we can switch on to two different definitions of truth, which entail two different conceptions of truth, namely, the absolute conception of truth and the semantic conception of truth.

An absolute conception of truth does not relativize truth to any system or language. If it is true that the sky is blue then the sky is blue, and if the sky is blue then it is true that the sky is blue. It does not matter who is the subject that believes the sky is blue, when or where it is believed so, in what language it is expressed that the sky is blue. If it is true that p then p, and if p then it is true that p. Thus the absolute conception of truth is expressed through the definition, it is true that p is true, if and only if p is true. It is also known as the minimal account of truth. Because it describes truth just by using a component part of ‘It is true that p’, namely, p. Of course, the p on the right-hand side of the definition is associated with reality whereas the p on the left-hand side is linked with language. No matter who is the subject S, what the language S uses, when and where S expresses it, if S expresses the proposition that p is true, the proposition p is true if and

only if in reality the fact is that p. Truth, as a necessary condition of knowledge, is put forth as

If S knows that p is true, then, it is true that p is true.

Now, since it is true that p if and only if p, we can substitute 'p' for 'it is true that p' and put forth the above condition as

If S knows that p, then, p.

A semantic conception of truth suggests that the truth of a sentence depends not only upon the facts but upon what the sentence means. Further, what a sentence means in a language L, at level, is different from what it means in a language L2, at level 2. The significance of this distinction between levels of language can be made out in finding how it helps us in avoiding certain logical paradoxes involving the concepts of truth and falsity. For example, consider the following statement

S: This sentence is false.

We cannot say that it is both true and false because given any proposition it has to be either true or false. To assert that a proposition must be either true or false, one should get over this type of paradoxical instance. One may try to avoid the above paradox by claiming that sentences that refer to themselves are not well-formed, as the above sentence appears to be so. But it can be shown that in sentences that do not refer to themselves the paradox recurs; for example, in the Postcard Paradox.

A: The sentence on the other side is true.

B: The sentence on the other side is false.

If A is true, what A says is true. A says that sentence B is true. Therefore, if A is true then B is true. And B says that A is false. Therefore, if A is true then A is false. On the other hand, if A is false then, B is false. Therefore, sentence A is true. Considering sentence A as either true or false, the conclusion is that it is both true and false. And sentence A does not refer to itself, it refers to sentence B.

The paradoxes cited may be avoided by carefully distinguishing between different levels of language. With the idea of different levels of language, goes the idea that a sentence of a particular level cannot refer to another sentence at the same level. A sentence at a higher level can only refer to a sentence of a lower level. Specification of language levels enables us to overcome the paradox, which the absolute conception of truth cannot meet. Consider sentence (S). As a sentence of a certain level, it must be about sentences of a lower level, and thus, sentence (S) would have to belong to the metalanguage of level n and the sentence referred to by the word 'sentence' in (S) would have to be a sentence at level n-1, the object language. Sentence (S) thus would read as follows: This sentence

of language level $n-1$ is false. But the sentence becomes false because it says that the sentence is of language level $n-1$ when in fact it belongs to language level n .

Let us consider sentences (A) and (B). If (A) is at level n , then (A) reads as

A: Sentence (B) at language level $n-1$ is true.

Since sentence (B) is about the sentence (A) at level n , it is at level $n+1$, which will read as

B: Sentence (A) at language level n is false.

Sentence (A) is false because it says that sentence B is a language level $n-1$ when, in fact, sentence (B) is at language level $n+1$. Hence, the specification of language levels enables us to avoid the paradox.

In accordance with an absolute conception of truth,

(a) If S knows that p , then knowledge. On the other hand, p represents the truth-condition of

(b) If S knows that the sentence Q is true, then Q is true represents the truth-condition in accordance with a semantic conception of truth.

By appealing to the absolute conception of truth, we could eliminate reference to ‘truth’ in the truth condition:

If S knows that p then it is true that p .

We can eliminate reference to ‘truth’ III (b) too by adopting Tarski’s Adequacy condition:

‘S’ is true in L iff p.

If we replace ‘ p ’, for example by ‘The sky is blue’, and also ‘S’ by a name of that sentence, for example, “The sky is blue” we obtain the following equivalence:

sky is blue’ is true in L iff The sky is blue.

By applying this condition of adequacy,

“If S knows that the sentence Q is true in L, then, p ”

turns out to be

“If S knows that p , then, p ”

where p roughly stands for the meaning expressed through Q.

Thus in the Truth-condition, the minimal conception of truth is sufficient for an analysis of knowledge and we do not miss anything in the analysis of knowledge even if we do not take up Truth as understood in the semantic conception of truth.

THE BELIEF CONDITION

Belief is a necessary condition of knowledge can be expressed as **If S knows that p then S believes that p** (Farkas 2015). No one can know something that he/she does not believe. If S knows that the sky is blue then S believes that the sky is blue. Anything I know, I must believe. Of course, it is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. Knowledge requires belief, but not that every belief is knowledge. Although initially, it might seem

obvious that knowing that *p* requires believing that *p*, some philosophers have argued for knowledge without belief. Suppose Tom comes home after work and finds his house burned down. He utters the words ‘I don’t believe it’. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Tom knows that his house was burned down (he sees that it has), but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. Therefore, there is knowledge without belief. To this question, there is an effective reply. What Tom wishes to convey by saying, ‘I don’t believe it’ is not that he really does not believe what he sees with his own eyes, but that he finds it hard to come to terms with what he sees. This way of speaking does not deny that *S* believes what he knows. He does believe but finds it difficult to accept.

The second objection is based on J.L. Austin’s account of ‘claims to know’ as performative utterances (Austin 2013). When a person claims to know, perhaps by asserting “I know that” before a declarative sentence, the person is putting his personal authority behind the truth of the sentence. The act of making a knowledge claim creates a new reality, for which the claimant can be held accountable. Suppose my friend and I leave our house for a long trip, and she asks me whether the oven is off. I tell her that I know that it is. When we return, the house has burned down, and I will be held accountable. In this way, claiming to know is like making a promise. Both are called “performatives” in that performing the ritual of assertion brings about a new state of affairs, a commitment/responsibility/ accountability. As a performative, it is not a constative (neutral description or declarative statement). Not being a description, it cannot be equated with an assertion of a belief to be true. On the contrary, the belief condition is a description of what *S* believes. In other words, in accordance with the belief condition, when a man says, “I know that *p*”, he is describing this state as being one of his beliefs. This problem can be overcome once we accept that performing a ritual does not necessarily conflict with one’s giving a description at the same time.

Following Radford, one may argue for knowledge without belief in the following way (Radford 1966). Suppose Jean is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: ‘When did Queen Elizabeth die?’ Jean does not think he knows but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correct answers to many questions to which he didn’t know the answer. On Jean’s answer, namely,

E: Elizabeth died in 1603, one may make the following two claims.

- (a) Jean does not believe that E. Because, he thinks that he doesn’t know the answer to the question. He does not trust his answer because he takes it to be a mere guess.
- (b) Jean knows that E. Because, his answer is not at all just a lucky guess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, the basic facts of English history.
- (c) That Jean does not believe but knows that E. This follows from (a) and (b).

We can respond to this counter-example by saying that this is not a case of knowledge without belief. It is not a case of knowledge to begin with. Even if a subject gives a correct answer that *P*, the subject does not know that *P* unless he knows that *P* is the correct answer. In short, the element of conviction essential for a subject to know

something is absent in the above counter-example. Thus, the sense of Belief in belief condition is not without qualification. Neither it is in accordance with the performative sense of 'know' nor is it in the sense of a belief devoid of conviction. Moreover, the sense of belief in the belief condition by which belief necessarily follows knowledge can be proved in the following way.

- I) If S does not believe that p then S does not believe that S knows that p.
- II) If S does not believe that S knows that p, then, even if S correctly says that p and knows that he has said that p, S does not know that S correctly says that p.
- III) Even if S correctly says that he has said that p, if S does not know that he correctly says that p, then S does not know that p.
- IV) Therefore, if S does not believe that p, then S does not know that p. By contraposition, the conclusion stated in (iv) is equivalent with
- V) If S knows that p, then, S believes that p. Thus, by this argument, one can prove that knowledge implies belief. In other words, we conclude that belief is a necessary condition for knowledge.

THE JUSTIFICATION CONDITION

We cannot identify knowledge with true belief because a belief that is true just by luck does not qualify as knowledge. Therefore, to rule out epistemic luck, we need a justification condition. A true belief, if an instance of knowledge, must be justified. Justification then is the heart of the analysis of knowledge. Keeping in mind that our conception of knowledge is that of the recognition of correct information as being correct, we can see that knowledge demands some means for sorting out the good from the bad information. To recognize information as being correct, S must not be correct as a matter of luck. For example, if his clerk entered and left his office at random times, and Brown accepted that he was in the office now, he might be right by sheer luck. Now change the case so that the clerk is ordinarily in the office at this time. If he accepts that his clerk is there now, it is more than mere luck that his information is correct. It is very reasonable for Brown to accept what he does, but he is not justified in accepting it. He cannot exclude the alternative that his clerk has left the office for some reason. Were Brown to improve his position, by looking into the office, he would be able to exclude the possibility that his clerk had stepped out. Would this be enough for him to fulfill the justification condition? Lehrer gives some hints. First, we learn that justification lies between reasonableness and complete certainty (Cohen-Eliya & Porat 2011). ('Certainty' here means nothing more than the strongest possible form of justification. It does not mean 'unyielding conviction', since the strength of conviction could be dogmatic and not justified at all). Lehrer's another comment in this regard is worth noting. He says that the person 'must be justified in a way that would justify him in believing that he knows, if he considers whether he does' (Lehrer 1993). Suppose Brown has the power to detect his clerk's presence in some extra-sensory way, but he is not aware of his power. Then successfully exercising his ESP does not give justification sufficient for knowledge. If he considers whether he knows that his

clerk is in the office, he will not take this information into account, and so it would not make it any more reasonable for him to accept that his clerk is there.

For a foundationalist, there are first premises of justification or some basic beliefs to which we appeal to have justification (Watson et al., 2014). The need for first premises is found when we think of justification as having the structure of an argument. In order for a premise to be a good reason, the foundationalist continues, it must itself be supported by a good reason. As this evidential support cannot continue without end, there must be a stopping point, a set of any 'first premises' which are not the conclusions of any argument. These first premises comprise the foundation on which all justification is built. The coherentist rejects the notion that justifying reasons are the premises of arguments. Instead, the coherentist proposes that one has good reason to think that information that p is correct if that information 'fits in' with all the other things the person accepts. No information is privileged as the first premises of the foundationalist. Roderick Chisholm likens coherence to the house of cards, where each card supports all the others but no card is self-supporting (Amico 1995).

THE GETTIER PROBLEM

Edmund Gettier's, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (1963), challenges the long-held traditional definition of knowledge: Knowledge = df. Justified True Belief.

That is, S knows that p if and only if

- (i) P is true,
- (ii) S believes that p,
- (iii) and S is justified in believing that p.

Gettier has cited two counter-examples to demonstrate the insufficiency of the three conditions. Through these counter-examples, he has tried to argue that there can be instances of justified true beliefs, which are not the instances of knowledge.

The first Counter-example

Smith has enough evidence to be justified in believing that A: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket

From A, Smith infers:

B: The person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith believes that B. B logically follows from A. Thus, Smith is justified in believing that B. However, it was Smith and not Jones who got the job. And Smith had ten coins in his pocket. In other words, it is true that B, although Jones did not get the job. Smith himself got the job and Smith has ten coins in his pocket. Neither Smith is aware of his ten coins in the pocket nor does he know that he would get the job. Nevertheless, by the traditional definition of knowledge, Smith knows that B since it is true that B, S believes that B and S is justified in believing that B.

The second Counter-example

Gettier's second Counter-example appeals to the logical principle of addition, i.e., p , therefore, $p \vee q$.

Suppose Smith is justified in believing that

A: Jones owns a Ford,

and infers the following three disjunctions from A,

(1) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.

(2) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

(3) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk (Le Morvan, 2017).

Since A entails and Smith recognizes each of the three propositions, 1, 2 and 3, he is justified in believing each of these propositions. Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown is indeed in Barcelona. Given these assumptions, in believing 2, Smith holds a justified true belief. However, it is not an instance of knowledge because Smith has no idea about Brown's whereabouts. He got a justified true belief namely either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, but it is by sheer luck. These counter-examples suggest that it is logically possible for a subject S to hold accidental justified true beliefs. On the other hand, traditionally, justification is meant for preventing accidental true beliefs from becoming knowledge. Justification is supposed to ensure that there is no element of accident, chance or luck in the instances of knowledge whereas, Gettier's counter-examples show that justification does not ensure so. For, to repeat, it suggests that there can be accidental justified true beliefs.

INADEQUACY OF STRATEGIES TO OVERCOME GETTIER'S PROBLEM

There are two different strategies to solve Gettier's problem.

1. To strengthen the justification condition, such that no justified true belief can be an accidental justified true belief.
2. To add a fourth condition, fulfillment of which can ensure the absence of accident in the instance of knowledge.

The second strategy recognises the validity of Gettier's argument. It admits that the three conditions of knowledge are not sufficient. That there is a need for the fourth condition in order to tackle Gettier's problem.

The first strategy does not admit the insufficiency of these three conditions. It tries to qualify justification conditions with certain features, which can supposedly overcome Gettier's problem. The following condition can be put forth in accordance with the first strategy. If S is justified in believing that p , then S has not inferred p from a false belief that Q . The above requirement can prevent any subject to be justified in having a true belief if the subject is depending on a false belief to have the true belief. Consequently, by means of this strengthened justification condition, one can overcome Gettier's counter-example. For both, the counter-examples do not fulfill the above requirement. In accordance to this stringent conception of justification, the subjects of the counterexamples do not possess justified true beliefs. However, it is easy to find

out that the above constraint on justification does not really enable us to overcome the problem. Because Gettier type cases can be constructed without accounting any false belief: I might infer that at least one person in our hostel owns a computer directly from true statements about Susan concerning the computer she uses, and so forth, without accepting the false statement that Susan owns a computer. Suppose I am interested in the question whether there is at least one computer owner in our hostel, I might reason that, though my only evidence of a computer owner in our hostel is what I know about Susan and a certain computer, there IS at least the possibility that someone else owns one, and, hence, it is safer to accept the general statement that at least one person in our hostel owns a computer than the quite specific claim that Susan owns a computer. This conclusion is derived from a set of perfectly true statements about Susan and the consideration that someone else in our hostel may, for all I know, owns a computer. Thus, dependency on inference from a false statement is not essential for Gettier cases. S's belief that p may be based on true statements and yet S may not know that p; however, the true statements do justify S to believe that p. On the other hand, the false statement q, held by S, defeats S's knowledge that p. In short, there can be false beliefs that defeats S's knowledge that p though S does not depend on those false beliefs to believe that p.

This is quite plausible on the ground that a subject may have alternative reasons to believe that p. One may even cite examples that involve no inference, hence, no true belief inferred from false belief, but involves the Gettier problem. Chisholm cites such an example. Suppose a man looks at a field and spots what he takes to be a sheep. The object is not at a very distant place and the man knows a sheep when he sees one. In such a case, it would be natural to regard the man as being completely justified in believing he sees a sheep in the field. However, what he is justified of, does not involve any inference. Imagine that the object he takes to be a sheep is not a sheep but a dog. Thus, he does not know that he sees a sheep. Imagine, however, that an object further in the distance, which he also sees, but does not think, is a sheep, happens in fact to be a sheep. So it is true that the man sees a sheep, and, moreover, he believes and is completely justified in believing that he sees a sheep. Of course, he still does not know that he sees a sheep because what he takes to be a sheep is not, and the sheep that he sees he does not take to be a sheep. Here we do not have an inference in the example at all. It is a case of perceptual error; a man has mistaken one thing for another. Thus, Gettier cases can be generated in terms of perceptual experience, thereby, keeping the problem intact even if one does not violate the condition, namely, "no dependency or inference from a false belief". The proposed condition cannot exclude all Gettier-type counter-examples. Gettier counterexamples can be constructed without accounting for any false beliefs. Also, it can be framed without accounting for any inference.

The first strategy is not a viable one. So now, we turn to the second strategy. The second strategy is to add a fourth condition to the existing three conditions. R.K. Shope (1979) claims that analysis of knowledge can avoid Gettier counter-examples once we recognize that in such examples falsehood plays a certain role in relation to one's

actual justification. When one is concerned with justified factual knowledge, one's belief or acceptance must be justified through its connection with a sequence of epistemic explanations not involving false-hoods at those places. This he calls, "Justification-explaining chain (JEC)". With this notion of JEC, Shope (1979) suggests that S is completely justified in believing that p if and only if 'S's believing p is justified in relation to epistemic goals through its connection with a justification-explaining chain (IEC) related to the proposition p' (p. 54). The JEC does not contain a false statement, hence, a justified true belief which satisfies a JEC cannot be defeated on the ground of being based on false beliefs. On the other hand, the procedure adopted in Gettier cases for the defeated knowledge contains false beliefs, perceptual on inferential. Shope's defense clearly points out that the fourth condition of knowledge must safeguard justified true beliefs from becoming accidental justified true beliefs by making the former unrelated to false beliefs. P. K. Moser proposes a fourth condition in terms of Truth-resistant evidence. It assumes that the kind of evidence essential to propositional knowledge admits of an epistemic explanation that is not contravened by the addition of any further true propositions. Moser formulates this requirement in this way: For S to have knowledge that p on evidence e, there must be an epistemic explanation of p that explains, solely by means of true propositions why S is justified in believing that p (or e) even if any other true proposition is conjured with e.

Moser explicates the notion of truth-resistant evidence as follows. S's justifying evidence e for p is truth-resistant *iff*, for every true proposition t, when conjured with e, t restores the justification of p for S in a way that S is actually justified in believing that p. With this condition of evidential truth-resistance added as fourth condition, Moser offers the following analysis of knowledge. S knows that p *iff* (i) P is true, (ii) S has justifying evidence e for p, (iii) S believes or asserts p on the basis of e, (iv) S has justifying evidence e for p is truth resistant. If the above fourth condition is satisfied, justified true beliefs turn out to be truth-resistant justified true beliefs. No truth gets the justified value demeaned. Therefore, if S depends on a false belief that amounts to say that S does not know that p even if S is justified in believing that p, then, as the justification value is demeaned, S does not have a justified true belief with truth-resistant evidence. In accordance with this fourth condition, one may hold a justified false belief but not a justified false belief with truth-resistant evidence.

Some philosophers have tried to put forth the fourth condition in terms of 'indefeasibility'. Chisholm, Pappas and Swain have proposed defeasibility analysis. Chisholm, for example, in his paper, 'The Ethics of Requirement' (1964), suggests that an explication can be given for the epistemic notion of defeasible if and only if there is a body of evidence e such that e is true and e justifies h, and this justification may be overridden. There is justification for h which has been over-ridden if and only if 'there is a body of evidence e and a body of evidence e such that:

- (i) e is true and e justifies h and
- (ii) e is true and the conjunction of e and e does not justify h.

Therefore, a justification for h is indefeasible if there is a body of evidence e such that e is true and e justifies h and this justification cannot be over-ridden. Similarly, Pappas and Swain suggested the following requirements: “In order for a proposition h to be indefeasibly justified the evidence e must be sufficiently so complete that no further addition to e would result in a loss of justification and hence a loss of knowledge”. This way of characterizing defeasibility allows that justification may be undermined by evidence, which is relevant to p , even though it is not evidence against p . There are situations in which knowing some statement to be false would be misleading rather than clarifying. Tom Grabit’s example illustrates this. You see Tom Grabit (2008) taking a book off the shelf and leaving the library. On the basis of this, you form the justified belief that Tom stole a library book. As it happens your belief is true. However, unknown to you, Tom’s father was going around today telling people that Tom was thousands of miles away and that Tom’s twin was visiting the library. The fact that Tom’s father said this is a potentially defeating piece of evidence. If you were to learn of it, it would defeat your justification for believing that Tom stole the book. However, as it turns out, Tom stole the book. Tom has no twin brother and his father has told such a lie because of the fact that he has a neurotic desire to have twin sons. In this case, it seems that you should count as knowing that Tom stole the book. The testimony of a compulsive liar, which you never knew, should not block your justified true belief about Tom from counting as knowledge.

For Swain to say that justification for h cannot be over-ridden, is just to say that there cannot be anybody of evidence e' such that e' in conjunction with the justifying body of evidence e fails to justify h . But how are we to understand the requirement that there cannot be anybody of evidence e' ? If it is to be taken as a logical impossibility, it is too strong for, if h is a contingent proposition, then it is logically possible that h is false and that there is somebody of evidence e' such that the conjunction of e fails to justify. According to Lehrer, the defeasibility condition has to be weakened by restricting the range of defeating counter-evidence, to those for which the evidence e IS strongly negative. Lehrer offers the following definition of defeasibility. If p completely justifies S in believing that h then this justification is defeated by q iff

- (i) q is true
- (ii) the conjunction of p and q does not completely justify S In believing that h ,
- (iii) S is completely justified in believing q to be false and,
- (iv) if c is a logical consequence of q such that the conjunction of c and p does not completely justify S in believing that h then S is completely justified in believing c to be false.

The fourth condition in terms of defeasibility certainly gives the advantage of an explanation that emphasizes coherence as well as on truth. A system of belief without a defeater is certainly a coherent system. Secondly, to get every defeater absent in a body of justifying evidence is to prevent knowledge from being based on false beliefs i.e., truth is kept as inherent in knowledge. However, the concerned strategy that adopted defeasibility has a mistaken presupposition. It presupposes that a subject can have

conclusive evidence in the sense that neither the subject entertains any possible defeater nor is there any defeater existing in reality with respect to a given justified true belief.

CONCLUSION

Summing up the above, we can note the following.

(1) 'Truth' in truth-condition of knowledge amounts to a minimal conception of truth such that the condition can be stated as

If S knows that p, p.

We had to emphasise this in our discussion of truth-condition because, not only that there are different theories of truth, like the correspondence theory, coherence theory and pragmatic theory, but also that there are two different conceptions of truth, namely, the absolute conception of truth and the semantic conception of truth.

(2) 'Belief' in Belief-condition of knowledge is understood in a nonmetaphoric sense of 'belief' and, also, in a way that neither subscribes knowledge in its performative sense nor does it subscribe a sense of 41 'guess' that can be counted as knowledge but involves no belief. Belief is taken in such a sense that it necessarily follows from knowledge and, accordingly, the condition can be stated as

If S knows that p is true, then S believes that p is true.

For this reason, after explaining how belief as a condition of knowledge should not be confused with the other senses of belief, we cited a proof for the idea that knowledge implies belief.

(3) Justification as a necessary condition of knowledge has been incorporated in an analysis of knowledge so that knowledge can be distinguished from accidental true beliefs. An account of justification is inadequate unless it enables to distinguish knowledge from accidental true beliefs. In other words, knowledge is not accidental true belief and a belief is not an accidental true belief means it is a justified true belief, hence, **if S knows that p then S is justified in believing that p** which is taken up as the Justification-condition of knowledge.

(4) The sufficiency of the three conditions- Truth, Belief and Justification- can be challenged. This is presented through our discussion on Gettier's problem. In our discussion we found two broad strategies of overcoming these problem and noted that both the strategies fail in accomplishing the task of overcoming Gettier problem.

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