An Interpretation of Kant’s Theory on the Representation of Possible Experiences: High Speculative Representation and Fine-Grained Knowledge

Abstract

Kant’s theory on the conditions of experience contributes to representing the possible object of scientific theories. I will argue that this is a viable solution to explain how fine-grained knowledge of necessary empirical statements is possible. The analytic part of Kant’s work, Critique of Pure Reason (1988), exposes the function of objective reference mapping, which involves a proto-semantic conception of the intentional structure to represent possible objects. It intends to solve the difficulties in the representation of concepts whose hyper-speculative content is not discernible by examples (sensible intuition), nor by formulas (Organon of speculative knowledge), nor by mathematical categories (models, projections). My exposition strategy will develop the narration of Kant’s category theory, founded on apperceptive concepts, as a response to the challenges of semantic indiscernibility. Moreover, as the paper builds momentum, I will include a discussion of some twentieth-century attempts to provide knowledge of the logical form of modal statements (I choose to debate Russell’s and Kripke’s accounts of modal knowledge).