A Critical Analysis of the Three Conditions of Knowledge


  • Isenyo Solomon Ogaba Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences. Federal University Wukari, Taraba State


Truth Condition, Belief Condition, Justification Condition


In analyzing the three different conditions of knowledge, in this work, we find that Truth as a necessary condition of knowledge ultimately amounts to a minimal conception of truth. That is if S knows that p is true, then, p is true. Secondly, we find that Belief as a necessary condition of knowledge is not used in a metaphoric sense of ‘belief’. Also, that it neither entertains the performative sense of knowledge nor does it allow us to interpret a guess as an instance of knowledge. Either of the two might lead to arguing for knowledge without belief. Belief is taken in such a sense that it necessarily follows from the knowledge and, accordingly, the condition can be stated as that if S knows that p, then, S believes that p. Third, this paper finds out that the main objective of keeping Justification as a necessary condition of knowledge is to distinguish knowledge from accidental true beliefs. Every instance of knowledge necessarily satisfies that the subject has enough evidence to be justified in what he/she believes to be true. In other words, if S knows that p, then, S is justified in believing that p. Also, in this work, I explained that there is no satisfactory answer to Gettier’s problem, hence, there is no necessity of identifying knowledge with Justified True Belief.



How to Cite

Ogaba, I. S. (2020). A Critical Analysis of the Three Conditions of Knowledge. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, 3(1), 127-140. Retrieved from http://gnosijournal.com/index.php/gnosi/article/view/94